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CIVIL RIGHTS AND ARBITRATION
IRVING KOVARSKY*
Labor arbitration in the United States is widely supported as a
means of quickly and efficiently resolving grievances between em-
ployers and unions and as a forum for social justice for workers.' It
is important to recognize that arbitration is more than a tribunal to
air employer-union differences; it is a mechanism by which the
employee is supposed to seek justice.2 Bringing differences between
employer, employee, and union to light in the arbitration process re-
duces the impact of the inevitable and disturbing tensions created by
day-to-day contact between these parties. As a result, the use of pri-
vate arbitration has been recommended by Congress3 and promoted
extensively by the Supreme Court.4 With this legislative and judicial
support, the use of arbitration has increased dramatically since World
War 11.5
* Professor of Business Administration, University of Iowa. LL.B., 1942, Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law; M.A., 1953, Loyola University; Ph.D., 1956, State Univer-
sity of Iowa; LL.M., 1960, Yale University. The author wishes to thank his graduate
assistants, D. Lynn Hoffman and Vern Hauck, for their help in the preparation of this
Article.
1. See, e.g., K. BRAUN, THE SETTLEMENT OF INDUsTaAL DISPUTES 130-35 (1944);
C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBrrRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 5, 19-23 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as UPDEGRAFF].
2. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); cf. Brandt v. United
States Lines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970):
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the ap-
plication or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The
[Federal Mediation and Conciliation] Service is directed to make its con-
ciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance
disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
See also id. § 108, 158(d). In addition, arbitration is commonly encouraged and reg-
ulated at the state level. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-107 (1971); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 89, §§ 3-13 (1969); MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.09, 572.03-.08 (1966, Supp.
1973); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:24-1 to -11 (1952); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7501-14
(McKinney 1963).
4. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
5. See UPDEGRAFF 2-3, 10. The need to avoid work stoppages during World War
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Because arbitration performs an important function in promoting the
resolution of labor disputes, criticism of arbitration has largely been
confined to advocating minor reform rather than major overhaul." In
fact, support in the United States is so broad that European countries,
where arbitration is seldom resorted to, have been urged unsuccess-
fully to follow the lead of the United States. For example, the Inter-
national Labour Organisation in 1951 strongly recommended the use
of arbitration in Europe.7 In 1971 the English Parliament passed a
laws which was to lay the groundwork for the introduction of private
arbitration, although so far there is no evidence that the parliamentary
will has been heeded. Arbitration is not employed in France, Spain,
or Italy to resolve disputes if an employer-union contract is in effect.
Arbitration's legion of supporters in the United States cannot under-
stand why the European nations, especially those in the Common Mar-
ket, do not turn to arbitration. Do Americans overvalue arbitration
or do the European nations recognize defects that we do not?"
While even the staunchest supporters of arbitration concede the
need for some improvement, they tend to overlook or minimize its
shortcomings out of self-interest, because of an apprehension of in-
creased involvement of -the judicial system, or simply because arbitra-
tion is regarded as superior to known alternatives. After all, they rea-
son, employer-union disagreement is inevitable, and what can replace
II resulted in the granting of extensive authority to the National War Labor Board to
arbitrate disputes and was partially responsible for the growth of arbitration. Id. at
2-3; see Updegraff, War-Time Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 29 IowA L. REV. 328
(1944).
6. See generally R. FLEMNG, THE LABOR ARBrrATION PROCESS (1965); Aaron,
Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 LAB. L.J. 605 (1959); Cox, Reflections Upon La-
bor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1490-93 (1959).
7. 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE 1951, arts. 876(H)-(O); INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR ORGANISATION, CONVNTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1966, at 804 (1966)
(Recommendation No. 92, 34th Session of the International Labour Conference, 1951);
see G. JOHNSTON, ThE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OROANISATION 182 (1970). See gener-
ally J. COT, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 260, 299-328 (1972).
8. Industrial Relations Act 1971, c. 72. For an earlier attempt in England to pro-
vide for arbitration of disputes between employers and workers, see Conciliation Act
1896, 59 & 60 Vict., c. 30.
9. See generally LABOR COURTS AND GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT IN WESTERN EU-
ROPE (B. Aaron ed. 1971); E. KAssALow, TRADE UNIONS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1969); Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character
of American Labor Laws, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1394 (1971); Ross, Prosperity and Labor
Relations in Western Europe: Italy and France, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 63 (1962);
Sturmthal, Collective Bargaining in France, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 236 (1951).
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CIVIL RIGHTS AND ARBITRATION
arbitration that would better serve an industrial society?'0 Many ob-
servers of the present system concede a need to train a greater number
of young arbitrators, to publish all arbitration awards, to develop
stricter standards for the acceptance of evidence, to follow more
closely the precise meaning of provisions in collective bargaining
agreements, and to increase the scope of judicial review of awards.
While much of this criticism is legitimate, these suggested changes are
incremental. The purpose of this Article is to present a view favor-
ing radical change.
One area of arbitration in need of close scrutiny today is the civil
rights arena. For the purposes of this Article, the meaning of "civil
rights" is limited to situations involving employer or union discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, nationality, sex, or age. While em-
ployers and unions generally respect and abide by arbitration awards
in civil rights disputes, do employee grievants find-and should they
find--equal comfort? Although I believe the need for reform is much
more extensive, this Article is primarily devoted to civil rights issues
brought to arbitration. Specifically, it addresses the question of
whether arbitration is a just means of adjudicating civil rights disputes.
State and federal legislation" require "fair employment" by em-
ployers and unions; yet, arbitrators resolving civil rights disputes func-
tion under controls which retard, or at least hinder, advancement to-
ward "fair employment." To support the argument for reform, I will
review the legal regulation of arbitration and examine the arbitration
process itself. I will also present empirical evidence which points to
the shortcomings of arbitration in civil rights disputes and suggest re-
forms.
I. THE LEGAL ATMOSPHERE AND CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
Historically, people have resorted to some form of legislation, judi-
cial resolution, or arbitration to settle disputes and minimize warfare.
For example, for centuries Bedouin tribes turned to hakims to resolve
disputes quickly. The hakim, or Muslim wise man, had authority to
make binding dispensations between disputing tribes.' 2 Because they
10. This attitude is reflected in the questionnaire-survey reproduced in the tables
in Part II infra.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970, Supp. II, 1972).
12. See generally A. MUSIL, Tm MARNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE RwA . BEDouiNs
Vol. 1974:59]
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wandered far from the seats of Arabic justice, Bedouin tribes had to
find peaceful means of settling inter-tribal conflict. Disputing African
tribes still call upon respected spiritual leaders to settle conflicts which
threaten the tribal peace, another form of arbitration.1  The mercan-
tile law that flowered in Italy, and ultimately was carried to England
and the United States, more closely resembled arbitration than a legal
system. 14 European merchants trading in Italy found it necessary to
devise ground rules that foreign and resident buyers and sellers could
live with, rules that were not legislatively or judicially supplied.
Although early public policy in the United States was antagonistic
to both unions and labor arbitration, commercial arbitration was al-
ready endorsed, curiously, when Congress decided to regulate labor
relations.1 5 Prior to the Railway Labor Act of 192616 and the Wag-
ner Act of 1935,17 few unions were powerful enough to force
employers to agree to arbitration even though an alternative forum to
settle conflicts was not publicly provided. Where agreements to arbi-
trate were entered into, the employer could ignore his contract to arbi-
trate or persuade the judiciary to find some reason to overturn the
award.18  In spite of some private will to solve differences peacefully,
426-37 (1928); Patai, Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian, 7 Sw. J. AN-
THRoPoLoGY 401 (1951).
13. It has been argued that arbitration antedates law, and even history, because it
appeals to a "deep underlying instinct . .. to prefer voluntary arbitration rather than
submission to authority." UPDEGRAFF 5, citing Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. Rnv. 132 (1934). Arbitration sometimes has
the advantage of permitting consideration of ethical, religious, social, and other extra-
legal factors; as a result,
there has been an element consisting of the older, more responsible, and
clearer minded folk in every age of society who opposed use of force and ad-
vocated settlement of controversies through the application of logic and a
study of the developed principles and practices of custom, ethics and law, and
public opinion based upon them, such as they were at that particular time and
place.
UPDEGRa&F 5, citing Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the
United States, 12 MINN. L. Rnv. 240 (1927).
14. See 5 ENcYc. SocrA. SCIENcEs Law Merchant, 270-74 (1937).
15. Cf. General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547
(1957); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Empl., 193
F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944); Lew-
ittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
16. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88
(1970).
17. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
18. See Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), cert.
dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); cf. Textile Workers Union, Local 1386 v. American
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/8
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public regulators either refused to become involved or reserved the
right to alter decisions by arbitrators.
At this time, states regulated employers and unions, even where
their activities affected interstate commerce, because contracts gener-
ally were within the sphere of state control. To understand the un-
equivocal support given arbitration by the Supreme Court since 1956,
it is necessary to appreciate fully the extent to which state courts be-
fore that time hindered the arbitration process. 19 As unions and labor
arbitration were increasingly accepted after 1935, judicial regulation
of arbitration under state law became less desirable.20 And while en-
actment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 193221 and the Wagner Act
in 1935 effectively aided union growth, neither these laws nor the sub-
sequent Taft-Hartley Act22 contained a set of arbitral ground rules,
such as those which regulated commercial arbitration. To this day,
the Norris-LaGuardia, Wagner, and Taft-Hartley Acts only endorse
arbitration as a means of bringing about industrial peace, without spell-
ing out mechanics. Given this legislative background, the Supreme
Court, after granting certiorari in cases concerning arbitration, could
have enthusiastically embraced arbitration, lent it partial support, or
ignored the general congressional endorsement by claiming a lack of
clear congressional direction. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills23 and the Steelworkers trilogy,2" the Court chose to support arbi-
tration fully and to create rules governing arbitration disputes in the
federal courts.
In Lincoln Mills, the backbone case, the Supreme Court held that
an agreement to arbitrate could be specifically enforced by a union
against an employer under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.25
Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961); Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steel-
workers, 289 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1961); International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 402
v. Cutter-Hammer, Inc., 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). See also Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 233 N.Y. 373, 135 N.E. 821 (1922), rev'd, 264 U.S. 109
(1924).
19. See Kovarsky, Labor Arbitration and Federal Pre-emption: The Overruling of
Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 47 MiNN. L. Rv. 531 (1963).
20. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
21. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
22. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
23. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
24. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970):
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Even though Congress had been silent concerning the enforceability
of agreements to arbitrate and state laws generally gave employers the
option of whether to abide by their agreements, the Court found
enough congressional direction to rule ,that section 301 not only pro-
vided the federal courts with jurisdiction in controversies involving la-
bor organizations in industries that affect commerce, but also "author-
ize[d] federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforce-
ment of those collective bargaining agreements and include[d] within
that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate griev-
ances under collective bargaining agreements. ' 26 Lincoln Mills served
as an impetus for the lower federal courts to develop "substantive fed-
eral law"2=7 in suits arising under section 301; as a result, courts, rather
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organ-
ization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ...
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce . . . and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce . . . shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the em-
ployees whom it represents in the courts of the United States ...
26. 353 U.S. at 451. The Court thus resolved conflicting constructions of § 301
by the lower federal courts. Compare United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg.
Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1957), International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.
Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956), and Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951) (§ 301 merely jurisdictional
grant), with Association of Westinghouse Empl. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d
623 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 437 (1955), United Elec. Work-
ers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953), Textile Workers Union v. Arista
Mills, 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951), Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Car-
riers Union, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950), Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F.2d
158 (9th Cir. 1950), and AFL v. Western Union, 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950), cited
in 353 U.S. at 450-51 nn.1 & 2.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found in the legislative history, see S. Rnp.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), expression of "a fed-
eral policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements [to arbitrate] on behalf
of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only
in that way." 353 U.S. at 455. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, described § 301 as
"plainly procedural," id. at 461, and vigorously disputed the majority's conclusion that
Congress "by implication" had repealed the common law rule against enforcement of
executory agreements to arbitrate and of § 1 of the Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1970), which specifically excludes contracts of employment of workers in inter-
state commerce from the scope of its rule that executory agreements to arbitrate are
enforceable in federal court. 353 U.S. at 465-66.
27. 353 U.S. at 457:
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than Congress, have provided the framework under which civil rights
questions have been arbitrated. Moreover, this framework has been
created for the most part in cases not pertaining to civil rights, in con-
trast to the development of ground rules in the related area of fair
employment, which were predicated on state and federal civil rights
legislation.
It is strange that Congress staunchly endorsed arbitration without
providing guidelines, aware as it must have been of the negative ap-
proach taken under state law. With the substitution of Keynesian eco-
nomics for laissez faire theory in the 1930's came increased govern-
ment involvement in the market place when necessary to promote the
public good-and the endorsement of arbitration constitutes involve-
ment in the market place. Perhaps there was unexpressed opinion
in Congress that procedural rules of arbitration were unnecessary; but
the failure to enact rules while promoting union growth and arbitration
generally is not easily explained. It is possible that the Depression
and World War II so completely occupied Congress that the promulga-
tion of a comprehensive arbitration code was ignored from 1935 to
1945. But this explanation is also unsatisfactory. After World War
II, Congress found the time to control unions through specific require-
ments and guidelines developed under the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-
Griffin28 Acts. Or perhaps Congress felt that the Supreme Court had
provided satisfactory regulation through its interpretation of section
301; why face political pressures and criticism if the Supreme Court
has created adequate guidance under the guise of interpreting the
existing law? But this explanation is also tenuous, since the piecemeal
regulation of arbitration by judicial decision, as Congress presumably
realizes, leaves much to be desired.
The [Taft-Hartley] Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points
out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems
will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack ex-
press statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the leg-
islation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range
of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem ...
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. . . . But
state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in or-
der to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy.
Although only four other Justices concurred with Justice Douglas, the decision has not
been overruled and has had tremendous influence on the development of arbitration
law. See UPDEGRAFF 30-31.
28. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1970).
Vol. 1974:59]
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Another possible explanation for the lack of congressional direction
centers on the states' fights theory which had so effectively stymied
the federal regulation of social problems in the past.2 9 While relying
on the commerce clause for constitutional justification of federal regu-
lation of labor and civil rights, members of Congress-many from the
South or conservative Midwest-promoted the states' rights theory in
an effort to limit the federalization of the civil rights movement.3 0
Since the amalgamation of the colonies into a nation, the laws regu-
lating contracts were of state origin, and "states' rights" promoters
were aided by a limited concept of the commerce clause. Employer-
union contracts calling for arbitration should remain within exclusive
state control if traditional states' rights theory is followed. But
Congress and the courts had already loosened state control by expand-
ing the scope of federal regulation of a significant variety of economic
activities under the commerce clause.8 1  Activities in the factory were
now considered "in interstate commerce" because goods were ulti-
mately shipped across state lines. In the civil rights arena, Congress
later took the position that states' rights are secondary to human rights
and that the commerce clause justified federal control;"2 the states'
rights doctrine was never intended to shield localized wrongdoers,
even if it was necessary to extend federal powers.
After New York"3 and other states34 passed laws curbing racial dis-
crimination in employment, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, authorizing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to conciliate discrimination disputes and permit-
29. Dissenting in Lincoln Mills, Justice Frankfurter counselled that the supposed
grant of legislative power to the judiciary under § 301 would create problems that
"present hazardous opportunities for friction in the regulation of contracts between em-
ployers and unions. They involve the division of power between State and Nation, be-
tween state courts and federal courts. . . ." 353 U.S. at 464. See also Gregory, The
Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 635, 637 (1959).
30. See Hearings on S. 1731 & S. 1750 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 265-66, 341-49 (1963).
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (unfair
labor practices); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (transportation of mo-
tor vehicles); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (conspiracy to monop-
oize supply and distribution of products). See generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1959).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970, Supp. II, 1972).
33. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 220-e (McKinney 1965, Supp. 1973).
34. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-67 (Smith-Hurd 1966, Supp. 1973); IND.
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ting private civil rights suits in federal courts.3 Federal regulation
thus began not only after many states had already passed fair employ-
ment laws but after the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and
courts decided that the Taft-Hartley Act required fair representation
for black employees." Title VII permits states to regulate firms
and unions in intrastate commerce, and gives them the first opportun-
ity to regulate those in interstate commerce.3 7  The federal law con-
trolled or could be brought to bear where state law did not prohibit
discrimination in employment and where the complainant was not
satisfied with the decision announced under state law. Clearly, the
federal government was to assume control where the state failed to
act or provided unsatisfactory relief.
Judicial decisions limited the application of state law in labor rela-
tions. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney"s and Teamsters Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,39 the Supreme Court ruled that while state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate industrial relations
problems of employers and unions operating in interstate commerce,
federal law must control.40 These rulings thus require state court in-
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l, 2000e-5 (1970, Supp. If, 1972). The 1964 law was
amended in 1972 to permit suits by the EEOC.
36. See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.
1955). The NLRB has also ruled that the unfair labor practice sections of the Taft-
Hartley Act can be used to protect minority workmen. See NLRB v. Tanner Motor
Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286
F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Whittenberg, 165 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947); Cer-
tain-Teed Products Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 495 (1965); Local 12, Rubber Workers Union,
150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Local 1367, Longshoremens Union, 148 N.L.R.B. 897
(1964); Durant Sportswear, 147 N.L.R.B. 906 (1964); Metal Workers Local 1, 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Associated Grocers of Port Arthur, 134 N.L.R.B. 468 (1961);
National Lime & Stone Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 282 (1945).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
38. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
39. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
40. In Lucas Flour the Court decided what was implicit in both Charles Dowd and
Lincoln Mills:
The importance of the area which would be affected by separate systems of --
substantive law makes the need for a single body of federal law particularly
compelling. The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a
process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the fed-
eral scheme to promote industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort
of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process thus strikes
at the very core of federal labor policy. With due regard to the many factors
which bear upon competing state and federal interests in this area . . . we
cannot but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of
Washington University Open Scholarship
68 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
terpretations of section 301 to follow Lincoln Mills, the Steelworkers
trilogy, and other federal decisions in a growing body of "federal" law.
Consequently, even in state courts, agreements to arbitrate are to be
enforced and interference with arbitrators' awards is not to be toler-
ated. Thus, a majority of civil rights disputes brought to arbitration
are tentatively locked under federal control, since many employers and
unions operate in interstate commerce, and many agreements call for
fair employment.
In Smith v. Evening News Association41 the Supreme Court held
that suits under section 301 for violation of collective bargaining agree-
ments are not preempted under the rule in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon,41 even when an employer's conduct concededly
constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act. By discriminating against union employees, the em-
ployer in Evening News was apparently guilty of both an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a) and of violation of a collective bargaining
agreement actionable under section 301. The Supreme Court took
the position that 'the employee could seek redress either before the
NLRB under the unfair labor practice provisions or by litigating under
section 301. Thus;, while Lucas Flour and Charles Dowd provided
multiple arenas of state and federal regulation, Evening News pro-
vided a multiplicity of federal remedies.
These Supreme Court decisions did not specifically call for overlap-
ping jurisdiction of arbitrators, courts, and the NLRB. Yet, if there
can be jurisdiction of the NLRB and courts over the same subject mat-
ter, then arbitration should not be excluded as a possible regulator.
These decisions created a situation in which different goals and needs
could be adjudicated at various levels, via arbitration, administrative
decision, and state and federal judicial rulings.
There are significant differences, however, between administrative
and court regulation and arbitration. First, there is a right of appellate
review in unfair labor practice cases, a right barred for the most part
federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.
Id. at 104. See generally Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CHI.
L. REv. 542 (1959).
41. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
42. 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). Under the Garmon rule, conduct which is argu-
ably protected or prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act is within the exclusive jurisdiction
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by the Steelworkers trilogy in arbitration cases arising under section
301. Neither the facts reported nor the law applied by the arbitrator
are to be subjected to further scrutiny.4 3 Secondly, the employer and
union select the arbitrator without the consent of the grievant. While
attorneys may shop for the most favorable forum available, they cannot
appoint the judge who will hear the case. And trial examiners work-
ing for the NLRB cannot be selected by the accused or accuser. For
these reasons, caution and control should have been exercised in ex-
tending jurisdiction to arbitrators.
In the Steelworkers trilogy, Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme
Court, announced a rule granting nearly unlimited authority to the
arbitrator, with the reviewing judge to act as little more than a by-
stander. Limited almost solely by the terms of the contract and sub-
mission agreement, the arbitrator was granted discretion not shared
by judges or agency administrators, whose decisions are subject to
extensive appellate scrutiny. This power and responsibility frequently
are not understood by arbitrators, who can be publicly useful without
being publicly responsible. Accountability to the appointing employer
and union is different from accountability to the public and to the
grievant. To draw an analogy, it was one thing to allow an employer
to secure an injunction in a labor dispute and another to authorize
an NLRB official to do so, as was provided in the Taft-Hartley Act.
Permitting an arbitrator's decision to go largely unchallenged, except
on procedural or contractual grounds, is particularly dangerous since
the grievant does not participate in the selection of the arbitrator, and
thus exercises little control over his decision.
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.44 a union
filed a grievance, on behalf of a member injured at work, under a
collective bargaining agreement which called for the arbitration of all
questions involving interpretation of the agreement. When the em-
ployer refused to arbitrate, the union sued under section 301 to com-
pel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, which
had determined that the grievance was frivolous and not subject to
arbitration under the agreement,4 5 and held that, regardless of
whether the grievance was recognized as justiciable, a court's function
in examining a refusal to arbitrate is limited to deciding whether the
43. See notes 44-52 infra and accompanying text.
44. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
45. 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959).
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collective bargaining agreement calls for arbitration.4" Since the dis-
agreement in American Manufacturing was whether -the employer had
violated a specific provision of -the agreement, arbitration should have
been ordered.
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.47 the col-
lective bargaining agreement contained a broad arbitration clause, ex-
cluding only "matters which are strictly a function of management;"
it also provided that disputes over the meaning of provisions in the
agreement were to be resolved through a grievance procedure whioh
culminated in arbitration.48  The employer decided that subcontract-
ing was "strictly a function of management" and, consequently, was
not to be questioned by the union or submitted to arbitration. The
union claimed that management's decision to subcontract work re-
sulted in a reduction of work available for employees, and thus was
arbitrable. Again, the Supreme Court decided that where agreements
provide for the arbitration of all disputes, they are binding in the ab-
sence of specifically enumerated exceptions, and restricted the judicial
function to a determination of whether the grievant's claim actually
involves the meaning of such an exception in the agreement. The
decision on the merits is reserved to the arbitrator.
How any clause in a collective bargaining agreement is interpreted
by the signatories reflects their respective interests: employers tend
to see most activities and decisions as functions of management, while
unions concede only that a few activities and decisions entail 'the need
for unilateral decision by management. The self-serving views of
employers and unions were recognized by the Supreme Court in
Warrior, but without a full appreciation that arbitrators also serve their
own special interests. The Court emphasized that arbitration is a
46. 363 U.S. at 567-68:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to sub-
mit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined
to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which
on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right
or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these
circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's
judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bar-
gained for.
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the griev-
ance. ...
47. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
48. Id. at 576-77.
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"substitute for industrial strife,"49 an alternative to resolving disputes
by the momentary relative strengths of the parties. Viewed as part
of a private agreement rather than as a substitute for litigation, arbitra-
tion must be respected and protected. °
The question presented in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp.5 was whether an arbitrator could reinstate an employee
with back pay after expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court held that courts may not review the merits of the
arbitration decision or resolve ambiguities in the arbitrator's opinion
by rendering an independent interpretation of the agreement. Courts,
rather, are merely to decide whether the arbitrator acted within the
authority conferred on him by the contract or submission agreement.
Justice Douglas did not establish convincingly those elements in the
contract which supported the arbitrator's authority to act after the
agreement had expired, and conceded that the arbitrator's jurisdiction
was uncertain. Yet the award was upheld, apparently in deference
to the anticipated benefits of leaving decisions on the merits to the
arbitrator's discretion.52
49. Id. at 578.
50. The Taft-Hartley Act directs employers and unions to bargain over "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
Since subcontracting can have a direct economic effect on employees, bargaining seems
compelled. Yet, the Warrior Court is dealing with employer-union bargaining power,
in which individual rights are peripheral, in contrast to civil rights disputes in which
individual rights should be paramount to those of the signatories.
In a recent case, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974), the Supreme
Court held that a dispute between union and employer over safety conditions in a mine
must be arbitrated, and the union prevented from striking, under a collective bargaining
agreement which called for arbitration of "any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at
the mine," and excepted from arbitration only disputes that were "national in charac-
ter." Id. at 635-36. The Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Third Circuit
that public policy prohibited the arbitration of safety disputes, finding instead that
safety matters were appropriate for resolution by the arbitration procedure:
We see little justification for the [appellate] court's assumption [that arbitra-
tors might not appreciate the workers' interest in safety], especially since the
parties are always free to choose an arbitrator whose knowledge and judgment
they trust. . . . Relegating safety disputes to the arena of economic combat
offers no greater assurance that the ultimate resolution will ensure employee
safety.
Id. at 637. If matters affecting life and health can be compelled to arbitration, there
appears no reason why civil rights disputes may not be similarly compelled under the
rationale of Gateway Coal.
51. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
52. In dissent, Justice Whittaker argued that any decision rendered four months af-
ter expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was clearly outside the submissionWashington University Open Scholarship
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In the landmark Lincoln Mills and Steelworkers cases, Justice
Douglas" extension of broad jurisdiction and protection to arbitrators,
if legally questionable, could be supported by social policy. Given the
time and circumstances of these decisions, there is considerable social
merit to the judicial philosophy enunciated by the Supreme Court.
There was evidence, based upon past decisions, that courts would not
permit the development of arbitration unless emphatically prohibited
from interfering.53  While the juridical traditionalist prefers to wait
for the more definitive guidance of Congress, the need for industrial
peace and the absence of sufficient reason not to enforce agreements
to arbitrate support the Supreme Court.
While the broad protection extended by the Supreme Court to arbi-
tration was in the public interest, the function performed by an arbi-
trator has a different impact upon the employer, union, and employee.
To the employer whose judgment is questioned, arbitration signals a
loss of control over the worker while it enhances union power and
prestige. Can an employer be found who is not dedicated to the
maintenance of his power and the minimization of union control? To
the union official, arbitration signals some control over decisions at the
work place and over contracts, a symbol of justice for members, and
proof of the value of union membership to workers.55 For the em-
ployee, arbitration means that the employer's decision is not final. It
is possible that an award favorable to the employee can be viewed
with disfavor by other union members, especially in civil rights
matters.
These diverse interests were not carefully considered by Justice
Douglas in Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers trilogy because they
agreement, and thus could be reversed. Id. at 600. Justice Douglas merely indicated
that it was "not apparent that [the arbitrator] went beyond the submission." Id. at 598
(emphasis added). While the burden is on the party challenging the award to show
that it was not authorized by the agreement, evidence that the parties had bargained
on the subject of subcontracting was ignored by Justice Douglas. Questions of con-
struction of the agreement are left exclusively to the judgment of the arbitrator once
it is determined that he is acting within the agreement Id.
53. See note 18 supra.
54. See Kovarsky, The Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate, 14 VAND. L. REV.
1105, 1106 (1961).
55. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Cutter Labs., 15 Lab. Arb. 431 (1950).
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were not germane. Justice Douglas clearly saw the need for a legal
framework that extended arbitration and the arbitrator's authority.
That most workers would benefit from the line taken by Justice
Douglas followed without question. Certainly the needs of minority
workmen could not at this point be of primary concern, especially since
they too could anticipate some benefit. When the Supreme Court de-
cided Lincoln Mills, the Steelworkers trilogy, and Evening News, the
interests of employees and unions largely coincided. Yet in the civil
rights area there can be conflict of interest between the grievant and
his employer and union. Today, more than ninety percent of the
negotiated collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration,
with employee needs and rights in civil rights disputes lumped to-
gether with the goals of the employer and union who select the arbi-
trator.5 6
There is another dimension to an arbitrator's decision. While the
decision affects the grieving employee, union interest extends beyond
the immediate award. Obviously the arbitrator's decision can direct
the future turn of events if many workers have the same or opposing
interests as the grievant. In civil rights cases, unions and employers,
often smug in the safety of their coinciding interests, only pay lip ser-
vice to fair employment; the grievant's needs are ignored in light of
these mutual interests.
The difficulties faced by the individual grievant were increased by
Vaca v. Sipes,5 7 in which the Supreme Court held that an employee
may not recover damages from his union for its failure to take his
grievance to arbitration unless the union breaches its duty of fair rep-
resentation. An employee thus cannot compel arbitration, but must
accept his union's decisions as to whether, and how far, to proceed
through whatever grievance procedure has been bargained for with the
employer, unless the "union's conduct toward [the employee] is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. ' 8 The difficulty of meeting
this burden is illustrated by the two examples offered by the Court
56. See A. MYERS, LABOR LAw AND LEGISLATION 665 (4th ed. 1968).
57. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
58. Id. at 190, citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), and Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See generally Note, Federal Protection of In-
dividual Rights under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964). The duty of fair
representation in racial discrimination cases was established by Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), and Steele v. Louisville & N.R.RL, 323
U.S. 192 (1944).
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of situations constituting a breach of the duty of fair representation:
(1) when the employer's conduct "amounts to a repudiation of [the]
contractual procedures; ' 5 9 and (2) when the union has "sole power
under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance proce-
dure, and if. . . the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from ex-
hausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to
process the grievance."60  The Court, as in the Steelworkers trilogy,
was concerned primarily with the effective role of arbitration within
the private machinery created for the resolution of industrial disputes.
Specifically, the Court suggested that enabling individuals to compel
arbitration would undermine the "settlement machinery" by destroy-
ing the employer's confidence in the authority of unions and by re-
turning the grievant to "the vagaries of independent and unsystematic
negotiation. 61
The impact of Vaca in restricting the available remedies of the in-
dividual grievant is even greater in light of the NLRB's earlier hold-
ing in Spielberg Manufacturing Co."2 that it will decline jurisdiction
to review alleged section 8(a)(3) violations which have been resolved
by arbitration, unless the award is "at odds with the statute.""" Con-
sequently, the Board retains discretionary jurisdiction to remedy unfair
labor practices only when the arbitration proceedings are not "fair
and regular," when it appears the contracting parties-but not the
grievant-had not agreed to be bound by the award, or when the
award is "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."64
The Spielberg rule was extended in Collyer Insulated Wire to
59. 386 U.S. at 185, citing Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery
Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
60. 386 U.S. at 185 (emphasis original).
61. Id. at 191. As additional reasons, the Court cited increased delay and cost,
increased difficulty in isolating major problems for resolution, and potential inconsist-
ency of resolution. Id. Perhaps aware that its holding might result in inequities for
particular grievants, the Court indicated that some grievances ought to be resolved prior
to arbitration: "In providing for a grievance and arbitration procedure which gives the
union discretion to supervise the grievance machinery and to invoke arbitration, the em-
ployer and the union contemplate that each will endeavor in good faith to settle griev-
ances short of arbitration." Id.
62. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
63. Id. at 1082.
64. Id. See also Wertheimer Stores Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1954); Monsanto
Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953); Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946).
65. 192 NL.R.3. 150 (1971).
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cases in which the employer refuses to arbitrate. In Collyer the em-
ployer was accused of unilaterally changing the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. Since the underlying dispute was arbitrable,
the NLRB declined jurisdiction to hear the union's complaint that the
employer's refusal to arbitrate constituted an unfair labor practice un-
der section 8(a)(5).66 Part of the rationale underlying the NLRB's
decision in Collyer was the need to respect the superior technical ex-
pertise of the arbitrator. Yet the NLRB is presumably expert in its
handling of unfair labor practices.
Thus, while Evening News recognized the grievant's right to seek
redress under either section 301 or section 8(a), Spielberg and
Collyer effectively eliminated the section 8(a) option when the griev-
ance falls within a category which is subject to arbitration under the
collective bargaining agreement. And the Collyer rule has been ex-
panded by the NLRB to encompass the other substantive sections of
the Taft-Hartley Act."7
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.68 the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a grievant who initially sought redress through arbitra-
tion is barred by his election from seeking subsequent adjudication
under state or federal fair employment laws. The grievant in Dewey
alleged that he had been discharged because of his religious beliefs
66. Id. The Board retained jurisdiction, however, to ensure that the arbitration
procedure comported with the standards of procedural fairness and compatibility with
the Taft-Hartley Act established by Spielberg. Id.
67. Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (Mar. 9, 1973); Enterprise Publishing
Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Feb. 12, 1973); A.S. Abell Co., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (Jan.
9, 1973); Associated Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Oct. 27, 1972); Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (Oct. 18, 1972); George Koch Sons, Inc., 199
N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Sept. 20, 1972); L.E.M., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 4, 1972);
Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (July 31, 1972); National Biscuit
Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (July 31, 1972); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1
(July 31, 1972); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (June 21, 1972);
Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (May 24, 1972); Norfolk, Portsmouth
Wholesale Beer Distr. Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (May 19, 1972); Great Coastal
Express, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (May 2, 1972).
Recent guidelines from the NLRB's General Counsel leave the role of the individual
grievant in doubt: "[Nlo case will be deferred if the respondent fails or refuses to
express its unwillingness to submit the dispute to arbitration. . . ." NLRB General
Counsel, Arbitration Deferral Policy Under Collyer-Revised Guidelines 17 (May 10,
1973). Whether a case should be deferred if an employee rather than an employer
or union objects to arbitration has not been decided by the Board. The use of "its"
suggests that the guidelines did not contemplate individual objection.
68. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).Washington University Open Scholarship
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and sued for reinstatement with back pay under Title VI1.61 Prior
to initiating suit, the grievant had brought the same complaint to the
attention of his union, which submitted it to an arbitrator who denied
relief. The court reasoned that since employers were bound by arbi-
tration awards under the doctrine of the Steelworkers trilogy, it would
be inequitable and would discourage employer agreements to arbitrate
if employees were permitted to litigate.70 The court expressly left
open the possibility of simultaneously bringing suit and submitting the
grievance to arbitration.7 . Subsequent decisions established that such
simultaneous actions may be permitted, 72 that an action is not fore-
closed unless the issues presented for arbitration are identical to those
arising under Title VII,71 and that courts may retain jurisdiction to
hear Title VII cases following an award under special circumstances.7 4
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970):
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
70. 429 F.2d at 332. Accord, Thomas v. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 455 F.2d 911
(6th Cir. 1972); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo.
1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974).
71. 429 F.2d at 332.
72. Cf. Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118, 1121 n.4 (9th Cir.
1973); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (election-of-
remedies doctrine not applicable when employee abandons grievance procedure short of
final decision).
73. Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454 (D.W. Va. 1971); Fekete v.
United States Steel Corp., 300 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); cf. Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d
569 (9th Cir. 1973).
74. In Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972), the court per-
mitted an employee to maintain a Title VII suit against his employer following an ad-
verse determination of related issues in arbitration. The court hald that it retained dis-
cretionary jurisdiction, analogous to that of the NLRB under the Spielberg rule, and
was free to defer to arbitration subject to the following limitation: (1) no deferral
if the employee's contractual rights coincide with Title VII rights; (2) no deferral if
the award violates rights or policy under Title VII; (3) no deferral unless the factual
issues are identical, fully developed and decided by the arbitrator, supported by evi-
dence, and determined in accordance with procedural fairness. See also UAW v. Avco
Corp., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 936 (D. Conn. 1971). See generally Meltzer, Labor
Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination,
39 U. Qn. L. RaV. 30 (1971); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. RaV. 1109 (1971).
Since Title VII expressly permits recourse to the EEOC to alter a decision by a state
fair employment commission, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), -5(c) (1970), there appears
to be little reason to bar relief after adjudication elsewhere. This rationale was adopted
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The importance of Vaca, Spielberg, Collyer, and Dewey was that
they restricted civil rights grievants' access to public authorities. In
large measure, the grievant's freedom to seek redress was confined
by his union, and the range of approaches might be limited by the
election doctrine. Meaningful "election" requires that the grievant be
fully aware of his options. Yet it was the union which frequently ex-
ercised the option, and the union might be subject to different influ-
ences and might entertain different notions than the grievant as to the
benefit of seeking redress in. a particular case. And the faith ex-
pressed by the courts in the expertise of arbitrators probably was not
warranted in the adjudication of civil rights greivances, because there
is no evidence that arbitrators are in fact experts, and because arbitra-
tors are subjected to kinds of "political" pressures that are largely ab-
sent in public agencies. In short, despite the implicit policy estab-
lished by Congress in Title VII that civil rights controversies are to
be resolved before a public tribunal, the judicial promotion of arbitra-
tion resulted in the private resolution of civil rights questions in many
disputes. 75
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 76 the Supreme Court recog-
nized these problems and held that an employee's statutory right to
a trial de novo under Title VII is not foreclosed by his submission
of the same grievance to arbitration. Following his discharge, the em-
ployee in Alexander filed a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement entered into by his employer and union, alleging racial dis-
crimination. Prior to the arbitrator's ruling that the employee was dis-
charged for cause, the employee filed a complaint of racial discrimina-
tion which was referred to the EEOC. After the EEOC determined
that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the employer had
violated Title VII, the employee brought suit in a federal court.
The Alexander Court, reversing the granting of summary judgment
for the employer, clearly established the right of employees to seek
relief under both private arbitration procedures and Title VII. The
Court's grounds for decision included: (1) Title VII does not indicate
by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974).
See notes 76-81 infra and accompanying text.
75. There is reason to believe that minority grievants would not seek NLRB or
court redress following arbitration even when they were permitted to do so. Many mi-
norities have a distrust of the machinery of justice, and may be influenced by their
unions that further effort would be futile.
76. 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974).
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that submission to arbitration bars judicial determination of claims of
discrimination; 7 (2) Congress favors multiplicity of remedy, for ex-
ample, endorsing state and federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases;78
(3) the doctrine of election of remedies is inapplicable because per-
mitting the enforcement of both a contractual right to arbitrate and
a statutory right to bring a lawsuit does not produce inconsistent re-
sults;79 (4) the expertise of the arbitrator is in technical and industrial
matters, and in construing the intention of the parties, rather than in
interpreting laws-yet an arbitrator's interpretation of Title VII would
be largely unreviewable, contrary to congressional intent in providing
a federal remedy for the vindication of civil rights;80 and (5) the
argued unfairness to employers of making arbitration binding on them
but not on employees fails to recognize that Title VII rights rest solely
-n employees, while the employer's willingness to arbitrate is a bar-
gained exchange for the union's agreement to refrain from striking.81
The arbitration cases prior to Alexander reflect a developing judi-
cial policy in the area of industrial relations: The collective interests
of organized labor are to be promoted over the interests of individual
employees in the context of particular disputes. Thus the Supreme
Court carefully delimited local influence on evolving labor policy by
reserving major interpretations of the labor laws, including control
over the arbitral ground rules, to the federal courts, and the Court
has discouraged a potential weakening of unionism by putting union
leadership in strong control over decisions affecting members' status
in the union and position within the grievance machinery.
This umbrella-type policy can be supported as being necessary to
protect the integrity of collective bargaining agreements and union
representation. But the policy is not as persuasive when viewed from
77. Id. at 1019.
78. Id. at 1019 n.9. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 824 (1972).
79. 94 S. Ct. at 1020. The Court expressly rejected the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit in Dewey, arguing that whether Dewey's "election of remedies" rationale was
premised on notions of res judicata or collateral estoppel, the "policy reasons for re-
jecting [it] are equally applicable. . . ." Id. at 1020 n.10.
80. Id. at 1022. See generally Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving
Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1969); Platt, The Relationship Between
Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REv. 398 (1969);
Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitrators' Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26 STAN. L.
R.v. 421 (1974).
81. 94 S. Ct. at 1023.
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the perspective of the civil rights grievant. The dangers of not for-
cing employers and unions to be bound by their agreements, and by
the award of an arbitrator, are clear; but the same rationale is strained
when the grievant-who is not a signatory-is included. The grievant
does not negotiate with the employer,82 nor, except in unusual circum-
stances, may he hold his union responsible for failure to prosecute his
grievance. 83  Finally, if his grievance is submitted, the arbitrator's
award is substantially immune from challenge.8" The problems of the
grievant are more acute in civil rights cases, in which preconceived
attitudes are less easily changed than elsewhere, and in which fear
of potential divisiveness within the union may induce leaders not to
vigorously prosecute the grievance. Put another way, industrial peace
and the promotion of civil rights are not always compatible goals; in
an area where discrimination is still widespread, subordinating the
latter goal to serve the former is questionable. The Alexander deci-
sion by the Supreme Court is limited recognition of this dichotomy.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY AND COMMENTARY
It is difficult to uncover the extent to which progress in the area
of civil rights has been impeded by the Supreme Court's arbitration
decisions. First, most arbitration awards are not published because
the contestants must approve publication; even when publication is ap-
proved, few awards are published. Secondly, from my examination
of both published and unpublished awards85 it was disturbing to find
that the quality of many opinions-particularly with respect to com-
position and grasp of legal issues-was poor. Many arbitrators are
verbose, as though they justify their fees by the length rather than
quality of their decisions. Rationale for a decision is often unclear,
facts are not fully reported, and legal decisions cited to support the
award are frequently not in point or have been overruled. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to determine whether unions representing griev-
ants were poorly prepared or whether the arbitrator failed to report
the evidence supporting the union's position.
82. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
83. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). But cf. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332, 339 (1944).
84. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
85. In 1972 the American Arbitrators Association gave the University of Iowa
many unpublished awards.
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The arbitration process has been the object of some criticism. It
has been observed, for example, that because arbitrators depend on
the concurrence of unions and employers for future appointments, they
tend to make compromise decisions, even when a clear-cut decision
may be called for.88  A compromise decision-defined as giving part
of an award to each contestant-is often a necessary or correct solu-
tion. When each opponent holds meritorious but conflicting views,
the neutral problem-solver properly recognizes the legitimacy of the
diverse claims and the need to temper them. But if compromise de-
cisions are intended to attract and retain clientele, the problem-solver
is no longer neutral; instead, the decision-maker is himself the direct
beneficiary of the industrial "justice" he is paid to dispense to the par-
ties. Such an award is in effect a political, or self-serving, decision.
Admittedly, determining with certainty when a particular compromise
decision is political in this sense would tax the most astute observer.
A second criticism of the arbitration process is that the arbitrator
should not function as a mediator.8 7  Private arbitrators in the United
States, unlike England, adjudicate disputes leading to the interpreta-
tion of an existing contract but do not help employers and unions
negotiate new agreements. A third criticism is that arbitrators do not
necessarily follow legal rules of evidence or rely on prior relevant de-
terminations in making awards.""
The independence of arbitrators has not yet been thoroughly dis-
cussed or examined.8 9  Freedom from political influence and the
86. Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbi-
tration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MIcH. L. REV. 1115, 1117, 1148-49
(1964); Raffaele, Needed: A Fourth Party in Industrial Relations, 1 LAD. L.. 330
(1962).
87. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV.
999, 1022-23 (1955); Syme, Opinion and Awards, 15 LAB. ARB. 953 (1951); Note, A
Study of Labor Arbitration-The Values and Risks of the Rule of Law, 1967 UTAH
L. REV. 223, 225-28. But see Bailer, Arbitration Procedure and Practices: Arbitrator
Viewpoint, N.Y.U. 15TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 349 (1962); Braden, The Function of
the Arbitrator in Labor-Management Disputes, 4 Aim. J. (n.s.) 35 (1949); Davey, The
Proper Uses of Arbitration, 9 LAB. L.J. 119 (1958). See generally Garret, The Role
of Lawyers in Arbitration, in ARBrrATioN AND PUBLIC POLICY 133 (S. Pollard ed.
1961); Johnson, Contrasts in the Role of the Arbitrator and of the Mediator, 9 LAD.
L.J. 769 (1958).
88. See Gray, Some Thoughts on the Use of Precedents in Labor Arbitration, 6
ARB. J. (n.s.) 135 (1951); Jones & Smith, supra note 86, at 1128-29; Roberts, Prece-
dent and Procedure in Arbitration Cases, N.Y.U. 6TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 149
(1953).
89. Many knowledgeable critics agree with Arthur Goldberg, former Supreme
[Vol. 1974:59
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avoidance of compromise awards is particularly important in civil rights
grievances if discrimination is to be ended as quickly as possible. Yet
maintaining independence is perhaps more difficult for arbitrators in
civil rights disputes, where the parties cannot be "separated" from the
issues. The pressure on arbitrators to appease the parties is increased
by the ability of the parties to "shop" for arbitrators whose opinions
are predictable and acceptable." At the least, in order to realistic-
ally anticipate being selected to adjudicate an issue, an arbitrator must
have exhibited some "sympathy" or "impartiality" toward that issue.9'
That participants return to "sympathetic" arbitrators is demonstrated
by the fact that in 1970, of the American Arbitration Association's
National Panel of 1400 arbitrators, only 458 made awards. 2 A 1971
study 13 showed that this selectivity is not drawn along lines of exper-
ience, since decisions in hypothetical situations did not vary signifi-
cantly between experienced and inexperienced arbitrators.
Court Justice and labor lawyer, that arbitrators are fair, competent, dedicated, and exer-
cise their best judgment. Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20
ARB. J. (n.s.) 13 (1965). See, e.g., Finley, Labor Arbitration: The Quest for Indus-
trial Justice, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1091, 1120 (1967); Strauss, Labor Arbitration
and Its Critics, 20 ARB. J. (n.s.) 197, 205-06 (1965). There is a minority who are
extremely critical, however. Eg., Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J.
1019, 1034-35 (1965):
There are only a handful of arbitrators who . . . have the knowledge, train-
ing, skill, and character which make them .. . good arbitrators. In literally
thousands of cases each year decisions are made by arbitrators who are wholly
unfitted for their jobs. . . . In fact, a proportion of arbitration awards, no
one knows how large a proportion, is decided not on the basis of the evidence
or of the contract . . . but in a way calculated to encourage the arbitrators
being hired for other arbitration cases . . . . [A] system of adjudication in
which the judge depends for his livelihood, or for a substantial part of his
livelihood or even for substantial supplements to his regular income, on pleas-
ing those who hire him to judge is per se a thoroughly undesirable system.
* * * In my opinion no discussion of arbitration which does not consider the
effect of the arbitrator's dependence on the goodwill of the parties is com-
pletely honest.
Accord, Koven, Limits to Accommodation, in PROBLEMS OF THE AD Hoc ARBITRATOR
313 (Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators,
1967).
90. See McDonald, The Selection and Tenure of Arbitrators in Labor Disputes,
N.Y.U. IsT ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 145 (1948).
91. See Manson, Is Arbitration Expendable?, N.Y.U. 12TH ANN. CoNF. ON LAB.
1, 1-20 (1959).
92. See Westerkamp & Miller, The Acceptability of Inexperienced Arbitrators: An
Experiment, 22 LAB. L.J. 763, 765 (1971). There is evidence that employers and
unions are also becoming more selective and critical of arbitrators; as long ago as 1959
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service noted an increase in the number of re-
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To determine whether arbitrators make "political" decisions, ques-
tionnaires were sent to labor lawyers, management, and union offi-
cials, and unpublished and published awards were reviewed. 4 A total
of 1169 questionnaires were mailed, 229 to unions, 286 to employers,
and 654 to lawyers. 95 The names of union officials were secured from
the national and international headquarters of their respective unions.
The names of employers were secured from the Fortune magazine list,
which is comprised of the 500 largest corporations in the United
quests for more than one panel. Report of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv-
ice, 1958, 82 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 408, 410 (1959).
93. Westerkamp & Miller, supra note 92.
94. In addition, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the American
Arbitration Association were asked to endorse a project in which psychological tests
were to be given to arbitrators to measure motivation and partiality. Permission was
refused.
95. The questionnaires sent to unions, employers, and lawyers differ slightly. The
questions contained in each are reprinted in the Appendix. Table I reflects the disposi-





Responses Questionnaires of Question-
Questionnaires Received But That Could Not Number Not naires Tab-
Mailed Not Tallied** Be Delivered Responding ulated
Unions 229 17 20 102 90
Employers 286 33 6 51 196
Lawyers 654 73 13 185 383
Total 1169 123 39 338 669
* Where responses in the subsequent tables do not tally with the totals presented in
Table I, the respondent failed to reply to a specific question.
** See Table 11 for explanation.
TABLE II
RESPONSES NOT TABULATED AND REASONS
Unions Number Employers Number Lawyers Number
Lack of experience 13 Lack of experience 13 Works as arbitrator 6
Does not believe Does not bargain Died or retired 3
in arbitration 1 with a union 10 Works for NLRB or
Uses permanent Uses permanent state labor board 2
arbitrator 2 arbitrator 7 No or insufficient
Canadian union 1 Unable to understand experience with
response 3 labor law or
arbitration 62
Total 17 Total 33 Total 73
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/8
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States. The largest unions and employers were contacted because it
appeared likely that their representatives would have had more ex-
perience with arbitration than would representatives of smaller organ-
izations. The names of lawyers specializing in labor law and collective
bargaining were secured from state bar associations and the American
Bar Association. Most of the lawyers contacted represent employers;
this was not intentional. Of the 383 tabulated lawyer-respondents,
287 (74.9%) represent employers, 69 (18.1%) represent unions, and
27 (7.0%) represent both. A total of 301 attorneys claimed to have
extensive experience in labor law and arbitration, while 82 did not
consider themselves to be specialists. Of the latter group, however,
only 15 alleged limited exposure to labor law and collective bargain-
ing problems, while the balance claimed considerable experience.
To ascertain the extent to which attorneys, employers, and unions
are responsible for the selection of arbitrators, we asked the respond-
ents to indicate on a frequency scale their degree of involvement in
the selection.96 Lawyers and management representatives partici-
pated more frequently in the selection of arbitrators than did the union
respondents: 86.1% of the lawyers and 90.3% of the employers indi-
cated that they participated either "always" or "very often." In con-
trast, only 73.3% of the responding unions fell within these two groups.
This statistical difference demonstrates that management and lawyers
(remembering that three-fourths of the respondent lawyers repre-
sent employers) play a more significant role in selecting arbitrators
than unions, and presumably have attained greater expertise. Finally,
a greater number of questionnaires were sent to, and greater percent-
age returned from, employers and lawyers than from unions.
96. TABLE M
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH LAWYERS, UNIONS, AND EMPLOYERS
PARTICIPATE IN THE SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS
Frequency Lawyers Unions Employers
Always 211 (55.2%)* 27 (30.0%) 112 (57.1%)
Very Often 118 (30.9%) 39 (43.3%) 65 (33.2%)
Sometimes 41 (10.7%) 21 (23.3%) 18 ( 9.2%)
Never 12 ( 3.2%) 3 ( 3.3%) 1 ( 0.5%)
Total 382 90 196
* Percentage figures represent the portion of each group of respondents within each
frequency. Thus, 211 of 382, or 55.2%, of responding lawyers always participate in
the selection of the arbitrator.
Vol. 1974:59]
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The respondents were asked if they knew the "factors considered
important" in the selection of arbitrators.97  To further evaluate the
expertise of the informants, they were asked to indicate whether they
had made at least one personal appearance before an arbitrator.
Many respondents indicated an awareness of the criteria of selection,
and very few had not participated in an arbitration hearing."'
Since the management respondents represented large firms with in-
dustrial relations typically under central control, whereas much of the
day-to-day operation of unions is left in local hands, all respondents
were asked whether employers or unions more carefully select an arbi-
trator. While national union officials are skillful, many at the local
level, like shop stewards and business agents, are not as well-trained
or experienced as employer representatives.99 Thus it could be ex-
97. TABLE IV
EXPERIENCE OF ARBITRATORS
Personal Knowledge of the Qualities Personally Appeared
Respondents Determining Selection of Arbitrators Before Arbitrator
Lawyers 136 (35.5%) 372 (97.3%)
Employers 74 (37.7%) 183 (93.4%)
Unions 74 (82.2%) 85 (94.4%)
98. Id.
99. The competence of union officials is less important when attorneys represent
them. Our survey reveals, however, that in a significant percentage of civil rights
cases, one party is not represented by an attorney:
TABLE V
DEGREE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Kind of Civil Representation
Rights Case Only Employer Only Union Both Sides No Lawyers
Represented Represented Represented Shown Total
Race & Religion 7 0 11 8 26
Sex 20 6 24 34 84
Race & Sex 0 0 1 2 3
Age 1 0 0 3 4
Total 28 6 36 47 117
These results were tabulated from 117 discrimination awards published in arbitration
reporters from 1961 to 1970: I-I-E Imperial Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. 1284 (1970); Gross
Distr., Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 756 (1970); Titanium Metals Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. 690
(1970); Community Unit School Dist. 205, 55 Lab. Arb. 895 (1970); Owens Publica-
tions, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 586 (1970); Agrico Chem. Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 481 (1970);
Missouri Pac. R.R., 55 Lab. Arb. 193 (1970); New York Tel. Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 525
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/8
Vol. 1974:59] CIVIL RIGHTS AND ARBITRATION
pected that management and lawyers representing either employers
or unions probably exercise greater care in the selection of arbitrators
(1970); Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 357 (1970); ITT Gilfillan, Inc., 55
Lab. Arb. 1210 (1970); Frito-Lay, Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 1142 (1970); United Aircraft
Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. 484 (1970); Weyerhaeuser Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 857 (1970); Lock-
heed-Georgia Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 769 (1970); Avco Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 165 (1970);
Allied Thermal Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 441 (1970); East Detroit Bd. of Educ., 54 Lab.
Arb. 330 (1970); Western Airlines, Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 600 (1970); Corn Prods. Co.,
54 Lab. Arb. 303 (1970); Sterling Faucet Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 340 (1970); Sylvania Elec.
Prods. Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 320 (1969); American Standard, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 1157
(1969); American Enka Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 562 (1969); General Foods Corp., 53
Lab. Arb. 291 (1969); Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 101 (1969); Canton Pro-
vision Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 942 (1969); Grand Rent A Car Corp., 52 Lab. Arb. 1065
(1969); Hall China Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 1259 (1969); Super Valu Stores, Inc., 52 Lab.
Arb. 112 (1968); Hercules Box Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 79 (1968); Hough Mfg. Co., 51
Lab. Arb. 785 (1968); Oldberg Mfg. Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 509 (1968); Electric Cord Sets,
Inc., 51 Lab. Arb. 418 (1968); Owens-Illinois, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 871 (1968); Phillips
Petroleum Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 522 (1968); Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 49 Lab. Arb.
1186 (1967); Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. 204 (1967); Franklin Appliance
Div., Studebaker Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 105 (1967); Creative Indus., Inc., 49 Lab. Arb.
140 (1967); Scott Paper Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 45 (1967); United States Steel Corp., 48
Lab. Arb. 1340 (1967); Alsco, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 1244 (1967); American Airlines,
Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 705 (1967); United Airlines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 727 (1967); Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 734 (1967); Morton Salt Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 487
(1967); General Fireproofing Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 819 (1967); Pitman-Moore Div., Dow
Chem. Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 709 (1967); Pangborn Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. 629 (1967); Allen
Mfg. Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 199 (1967); VR/Wesson Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 339 (1967); Rob-
ertshaw Controls Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 101 (1967); Marathon County Farmers Union
Coop., 48 Lab. Arb. 206 (1967); McCall Corp., 67-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 4751
(1967); Kaiser Founda ion Hosp., 67-2 CCH LAB. Aim. AWARDS 4665 (1967); Peer
Food Prods., 67-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS % 3714 (1967); Land-Air, Inc., 67-1 CCH
LAB. ARB. AWARDS [ 3600 (1967); Victor Balata & Textile Belting Co., 47 Lab. Arb.
1167 (1966); Eaton Mfg. Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 1045 (1966); International Paper Co., 47
Lab. Arb. 896 (1966); Buco Prods., Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 17 (1966); Hotel Empl. Ass'n,
47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966); Ingraham Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 884 (1966); National Lead Co.,
48 Lab. Arb. 405 (1966); National Cash Register Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 248 (1966); Pitts-
burgh Steel Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 88 (1966); Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 931
(1966); Ozark Smelting & Mining Div., 46 Lab. Arb. 697 (1966); Paterson Parchment
Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 260 (1966); W.M. Chace Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 231 (1966); American
Sugar Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 396 (1966); Schaefer Super Markets, Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. 115
(1966); Northwest Airlines, Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. 238 (1966); Sperry-Rand Corp., 46
Lab. Arb. 961 (1966); Lockheed-Georgia Co., 66-3 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 6686
(1966); Rold Gold Foods, 66-3 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 1 6046 (1966); Federal Servs.,
Inc., 66-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 4306 (1966); Collins Radio Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 939
(1965); Yale & Towne, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 923 (1965); Apex Mach. & Tool Co., 45
Lab. Arb. 417 (1965); Hercules Powder Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 448 (1965); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 621 (1965); Braniff Airways, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 769 (1965);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 240 (1965); L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co.,
44 Lab. Arb. 873 (1965); Board of Educ., 45 Lab. Arb. 265 (1965); Whittaker Corp.,
44 Lab. Arb. 152 (1965); American Mach. & Foundry Co., 66-1 CCH LAB. ARB.Washington University Open Scholarship
86 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:59
than do union officials. 100 To a large extent we anticipated that all
AWARlDS 11 3110 (1965); Gremar Mfg. Co., 66-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 3008 (1965);
DeMello's Office Furniture Co., 65-2 CCH LAB. Axn. AWARDS 5642 (1965); Mead
Corp., 65-2 CCH LAB. ARn. AWARDs 11 5329 (1965); Standard Oil Co., 65-2 CCH LAB.
ARn. AwARDs f 5210 (1965); United States Plywood Corp., 65-1 CCH LAB. Ann. Awmius
4374 (1965); Holland Suco Color Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1022 (1964); Reliance Elec. &
Eng'r Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1181 (1964); Akron Metallic Gasket Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 807
(1964); Oxford Paper Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 630 (1964); St. Clair Rubber Co., 43 Lab.
Arb. 562 (1964); Mead Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 391 (1964); Northern Engraving & Mfg.
Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 460 (1964); Lockheed-Georgia Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 289 (1964);
Dewey-Portland Cement Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 165 (1964); Riegel Paper Corp., 44 Lab.
Arb. 129 (1964); Whittaker Controls & Guidance, 42 Lab. Arb. 938 (1964); Rockwell-
Standard Seating Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 638 (1964); Tri-City Container Corp., 42 Lab.
Arb. 1044 (1964); Container Stapling Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 182 (1964); Century Elec.
Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 429 (1964); Quaker Oats Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 433 (1964); Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 715 (1964); Armco Steel Corp., 64-2 CCH LAB. Am.
AwARDs 5197 (1964); Mead Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 224 (1963); Phillips Chem. Co., 41
Lab. Arb. 411 (1963); Minute Maid Co., 63-2 CCH LAB. Ann. AwARDs 11 4893 (1963);
United States Borax & Chem. Corp., 63-2 CCH LAB. ARB. Awmws 1 4471 (1963);
James R. Kearney Corp., 62-2 CCH LAB. Ann. AwARDs 5033 (1962); American Sugar
Refining Co., 62-1 CCH LA. Ann. AwARDs 3443 (1961).





Kind of Civil I Lawyer &
Rights Case Lawyer Professor Professor Unknown Total
Race & Religion 14 6 4 2 26
Sex 36 24 14 10 84
Race & Sex 1 0 2 0 3
Age 1 2 0 1 4
Total 52 32 20 13 117
100. TABLE VII
DEGREE OF CARE EXERCISED IN SELECTING ARBITRATORS*
Responses
Respondent Employers Unions Neither (equally careful) Don't Know
Lawyers 144 37 107 82
Employers 121 1 16 45
Unions 33 17 26 12
Total 298 55 149 139
* The Table compiles the respondents' evaluations of the care exercised by the parties in
arbitration in selecting an arbitrator. Thus, 37 lawyer-respondents indicated that
unions exercised greater care than employers in selecting an arbitrator.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/8
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respondents would claim more, or at least equal, care. Since respond-
ents representing employers outnumbered those representing unions,
it was inevitable that the tabulation would favor management. What
was surprising was that more union respondents felt management is
more careful than unions; on the other hand, only one management
respondent felt that unions exercise greater care. This raises doubt
as to whether union officials are adequately representing civil rights
grievants, particularly when it is recognized that unions are assisted
by attorneys less frequently than employers.
The respondents were asked to specify why employers or unions
more carefully select arbitrators.10 1 The reasons assigned were num-
101. TABLE VIII
REASONS WHY EMPLOYERS OR UNIONS MORE
CAREFULLY SELECT ARBITRATORS
Frequency
Reason Assigned Lawyers Employers Unions
1. Employer has more resources and personnel
2. Union has more resources and personnel
3. Impact of decision greater on employer, so it is
more careful
4. Impact of decision greater on union or member,
so union is more careful
5. Staff of employer better trained and more care-
fully selects arbitrators
6. Arbitrators tend to favor unions and employees,
forcing employers to be more careful
7. Employers have more information than unions
8. Employers more often than unions are repre-
sented by attorneys, who tend to be more care-
ful in selecting arbitrator
9. Employers are more careful, preferring arbitra-
tors with judicial temperament, training, or con-
servativeness
10. Unions are more careful, keep better records,
and are more experienced
11. Unions get better legal advice
12. Employers are more careful because disputes
involve moral issues or problems in which the
answer is uncertain
13. Employers and unions are equally careful in se-
lecting arbitrators by checking their past records
14. Unions are more careful because arbitrators fa-
vor employers
15. Unions are more careful because the criteria
used for selection go beyond those necessary to
win the grievance
16. Unions are more careful because employer is
certain of the soundness of his position
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erous and not highly concentrated. Compiling the statistical frequency
of answers was made difficult because the responses were not always
clear. But the responses do tend to support and explain a conclusion
reached in a 1967 study'0 2 that most awards favor management. The
study assigned five reasons,' 03 including that employers are better pre-
pared than unions. The answers to our questionnaires reveal that a
significant portion of all three groups found employers to have super-
ior resources, personnel, and information. 0 4
A large number of respondents believed that large employers have
more resources and personnel to rely on than do local unions, permit-
ting employers the luxury of selecting arbitrators more carefully.
While many of the union respondents were affiliated with large and
resourceful international or national unions, others represented locals
with limited resources. Large corporations also hire outstanding legal
talent, which is partly responsible for the greater care in the selection
of arbitrators by management.
Regardless of which participant is more careful, civil rights griev-
concern is the company while unions represent
many locals 2 1 2
18. Employers are more careful because they are
less trusting than unions of arbitrators with an
academic background 1 0 1
102. Finley, supra note 89, at 1107.
103. The other four reasons were: (1) because they are politically more vulnerable,
union leaders are apt to bring "bad" cases before arbitrators; (2) unions are subjected
to more adverse publicity than employers, which gives employers a psychological advan-
tage; (3) many arbitrators feel that their judgment should not be substituted for that
of employers-yet, management believes that too many arbitrators are reluctant to sus-
tain a decision to discharge an employee, see Levitt, Practical Problems in the Handling
of Grievances and Labor Arbitrations, 3 GA. L. Rv. 411, 414 (1969); and (4) arbitra-
tors accept irrelevant evidence to support employer positions. Finley, supra note 89,
at 1107.
Newscasters and newspapermen have unfairly emphasized union wrongdoing and
minimized employer wrongdoing in the civil rights arena. This is partly because unfair
employment practice charges against employers brought under state or federal discrim-
ination laws cannot be publicized until a public hearing is held. Since most charges
are settled at the investigatory or conciliatory level, employers appear to have a better
track record than unions. Probably more conscious of public relations than are unions,
employers have managed to create the impression that either plant economics or unions
are responsible for much discrimination. And it is possible that weak civil rights cases
are taken to arbitration by politically vulnerable union officials who are subjected to
both "inside" and "outside" criticism; this view is supported by our spot check of un-
published awards.
104. This conclusion reflects the frequency of assigned reasons 1, 5, and 7 in Table
VIII. See note 101 supra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/8
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ants do not select arbitrators, and it is reasonable to assume that arbi-
trators decide many cases that grievants would not submit to arbitra-
tion if they exercised a knowledgeable choice. Even when employers
and unions are equally careful, arbitrators know that past decisions will
influence future appointments. In civil rights cases, the "liberal" ver-
sus "conservative" label fairly or unfairly hung on the arbitrator can
determine whether he is selected. Since an increasing number of civil
rights disputes are arbitrated by a small circle of arbitrators-whose
decisions are largely not subject to review-reexamination of public
policy is necessary.105
One result of the factors discussed above-the greater expertise of
management in the selection of arbitrators, the "political" pressures
on arbitrators to avoid liberal awards, the finality of arbitrators' deci-
sions, and union control over the decision to bring specific grievances
to arbitration-is that the disposition of civil rights questions in labor
controversies has not kept pace with judicial thinking. Federal labor
legislation prior to 1964 was not focused on civil rights and discrimina-
tory racial practices in employment. But with the judicial reduction
of discrimination in other areas-for example, housing,106 politics, 10 7
and economic rights' 8-s the NLRB slowly began to discourage racial
105. See Kilberg, The FMCS and Arbitration: Problems and Prospects,
94 MoNTHLy LAB. REV. 40, 43-44 (Apr. 1971). In response to the refusal of employ-
ers and unions to appoint new arbitrators, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv-
ice considered publishing all awards. While this could lead to the acceptance of a large
number of arbitrators, it could also cause the blackballing of others on the ground that
they were considered radical exponents of civil rights.
106. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
107. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
108. Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam); Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944); see Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). In addition, with the ex-
pansion of constitutional and legislative protections for minorities came a gradual shift-
ing of the burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant to support a new, liberalized
public poilcy. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc., 27 L.R.R.M.
2072 (Sup. Ct. New Haven County, Conn. 1950); DeMatas v. Building Serv. Empl.
Int'l Union, Local 32-B, 6 RAcE REL. L.R. 1208 (N.Y. Comm'n Ag. Diser. 1961);
Banks v. Capital Airlines, 5 RACE REL. L.R. 263 (N.Y. Comm'n Ag. Discr. 1960);
Franklin v. TWA, 2 RAcE REL. L.R. 867 (N.Y. Comm'n Ag. Discr. 1957); City of
Pittsburgh v. Plumbers Local 27, 59 L.R.R.M. 2553 (County Ct. Allegheny County,
Pa. 1965); cf. Arnold v. Ballard, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 287 (N.D. Ohio 1973); In
re Jeanpierre, I RACE REL. L.R. 685 (N.Y. Sup. Ci 1956), modified, 3 App. Div. 2d
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discrimination under the unions' duty of fair representation and the
unfair labor practice provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.10 9 This not
only provided a much needed forum to deal with discrimination in em-
ployment but also eased the burden of proof for grievants, since the
hearings were held before an administrative agency."10
The change in judicial attitude toward discrimination in employment
is illustrated by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"' a 1971 Title VII case.
An employer tested job applicants and candidates for promotion to de-
termine their educational and intellectual fitness. Although it ac-
knowledged that the resulting racial discrimination was not intentional,
the Supreme Court found a violation of Title VII in the adverse impact
of the employer's hiring and promotion procedures on the black com-
munity. Data established that blacks were given inferior schooling,
were less likely than whites to complete high school, and did not score
as well as whites on the tests. Thus Title VII is violated without any
intentional wrongdoing when hiring techniques screen out blacks from
job opportunities, unless the employer can prove that hiring techniques
adopted after Title VII was enacted are necessary to secure good em-
ployees, -an express exception to -the rule in Duke Power.
Other practices which have a discriminatory effect may be less sus-
ceptible of Title VII disposition, and should be adjudicated before
arbitrators in a fashion consistent with Duke Power. Other judicial
decisions offer additional guidance. For example, the seniority clause
found in most collective bargaining agreements gives a senior man of
equal ability with other applicants the first opportunity at promotion.
Most collective bargaining agreements provide for departmental,
rather than plant, company, or job-wide, seniority, which has the ef-
fect of freezing blacks in -the least desirable departments due to past
hiring practices. 1 2  Fair employment legislation forbids the isolation
514, 162 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1957), aff'd as modified, 4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 N.E.2d 882, 173
N.Y.S.2d 597 (1958).
109. See Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam); Hughes
Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 100
(1946).
110. Section 101 of the Taft-Hartley Act does not require the NLRB to follow
courtroom rules of evidence; it requires that "[amny such proceeding shall, so far as prac-
ticable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence...." 29 U.S.C. §
160(b) (1970).
111. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
112. See Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Bragg v.
[Vol. 1974:59
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of blacks or women in particular departments or jobs, but this policy
cannot be enforced if white male jobholders retain their seniority, built
up when discrimination was not illegal, and blacks who are transferred
to another department lose seniority accumulated in the past. To
combat this "unintentional" discrimination, courts have found viola-
tions on the ground that the effect of these seniority clauses is to re-
tard minority advancement.'"'
Court decisions on testing and seniority can be interpreted as ex-
amples of a shift toward the judicial acceptance of sociological and
statistical evidence of discrimination practices in employment. These
decisions have broadened Title VII coverage to include practices
which were not intended to have discriminatory effects, despite a con-
gressional declaration that neither employers nor unions are to be held
responsible for violating Title VII without proof of intentional discrimi-
nation.11 Employers believe that they should not be 'held responsible
unless proof of intentional discrimination is produced. They reason
that testing is "scientific," accurately weeding out the less suitable em-
ployees. While unions have not voiced serious objection to the testing
decisions, they have been unhappy over the seniority clause rulings
which erode job protection for white members. Union leaders argue
that the seniority clause must be kept intact to protect job rights and
promotion for members who have exhibited years of loyalty to their
employers. Furthermore, union spokesmen contend that the seniority
clause is non-discriminatory and will benefit minorities as fair employ-
ment spreads.
Arbitration has provided employers and unions which seek to dis-
criminate or are unwilling to tolerate the "effect doctrine" enunciated
in Duke Power with a means for retarding civil rights progress. It
cannot be emphasized too strongly that the effect doctrine chips away
at the control over hiring and promotion traditionally exercised by em-
Robertshaw Controls Co., 355 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); United States v. Nav-
ajo Freight Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1971). See generally Kovarsky,
Current Remedies for the Discriminatory Effects of Seniority Agreements, 24 VAND.
L. REV. 683 (1971).
113. See Local 189, Papermakers Union v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp.
835 (M.D.N.C. 1970); Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 62 CCH Lab. Cas. % 6712 (N.D.
Ga. 1970); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y.
1970); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
114. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
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ployers and unions. Employers fear that the doctrine will increase
costs and reduce their control, while union leaders fear an erosion of
power when fair employment is pushed too quickly. Many blacks are
critical of union leadership and some officials find this threatening.
That more civil rights grievances are arbitrated now than ten years
ago is suspect; after all, why should employers and unions bear the
cost of arbitration when grievants can turn to publicly supported agen-
cies for relief. In the last analysis, unions determine which griev-
ances are carried to arbitration, thereby avoiding the "radical" policy
and decisions of administrative agencies and courts. Since employers
often share a similar view, complainants are channeled into arbitration
where more traditional procedures can be followed.
The factors influencing an arbitrator are innumerable. To deter-
mine what factors are considered important in selecting arbitrators, re-
spondents were asked to indicate what aspects were investigated to
"predict" the arbitrator's decision. The answers reflected the import-
ance of six qualities which affect the selection of arbitrators. First,
a prospective arbitrator may have a history of holding liberal and con-
servative views on different issues. For example, an arbitrator may
feel that discharge as an industrial penalty should be sparingly applied
against long-term employees. Yet -the same arbitrator may feel that
civil rights progress must be slow to avoid industrial turmoil. "Incon-
sistent" views of an arbitrator may therefore cause him to be subjected
to careful investigation.
Second, the weight attached to certain types of evidence by arbi-
trators is often scrutinized. Arbitrators of the "old school" may be
unwilling to accept sociological or statistical data on the ground that
they do not establish wrongful conduct in the particular case. On the
other hand, younger and more liberal arbitrators may be willing to ac-
cept composite data. Moreover, since many arbitrators are legally
trained and law schools today devote considerable attention to civil
rights issues, younger arbitrators may sympathize with minorities and
thus more readily accept changes in the traditional rules of evidence.
This may in part explain the reluctance of management to hire young
arbitrators. The views of older arbitrators are reinforced when they
are continually sought after by employers and unions in civil rights
grievances. Young arbitrators seeking economic success are aware of
this, and it is likely to color the views they hold.""
115. In addition, sudden and catastrophic changes in economic or social conditions
[Vol. 1974:59
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Third, union leaders function with political acumen where internal
democracy is practiced. To satisfy members and prove the value of
the union, leaders sometimes take to arbitration grievances which are
acknowledged to be weak. Under these conditions the arbitrator's de-
cision is pre-ordained. One attorney-respondent mentioned a union
leader, whom he had advised against taking a grievance to arbitration,
who wanted to lose the case. Many rank-and-file union members em-
ployed in the construction and rubber trades exhibit hostility to min-
orities.116 Some unions which are known for liberal leadership, like
the United Auto Workers in Detroit, have experienced increasing dis-
satisfaction from white members who do not want blacks in better-
paying jobs. The United Steelworkers has only slowly been prodded
into improving the lot of minority members. 1 17  Under these circum-
stances, both weak and supportable grievances may be taken to arbi-
tration-weak claims to satisfy minority members and supportable
claims to keep them from resorting to public agencies.
Fourth, most arbitrators work on a part-time basis, engaging full-
time most frequently in the practice of law or -teaching. In fact, due
to the current practice of selecting ad hoc arbitrators, there are only
a few occupations where interested moonlighters with the necessary
background can find the time during the day to add to their income.
The concern here is whether part-time arbitrators are more likely than
full-time arbitrators to compromise. Because part-time arbitrators
have another source of income, it is possible that they are less depen-
dent than full-time arbitrators on the income from arbitration and have
less need to compromise. Yet the part-time arbitrator must be eco-
can spearhead change in the thinking of an arbitrator. The Depression and World War
II were certainly responsible for shifting government from a laissez faire economic phil-
osophy to one of limited control of industry. Racial violence in the 1960's also in-
creased the tempo of change. These economic and civil rights changes could influence
arbitrators concerned with fair play and justice. Revolt and publicity may also create
an impression that change has been too rapid and one-sided. This can negatively influ-
ence arbitrators-for example, in large cities where crime is more commonplace and
industry is forced to deal with mounting tension in the factory. An arbitrator may
be influenced by the physical aspects of a civil rights dispute and ignore its social back-
ground.
116. See H. NORTHRUP, THE NEGRO w THE RUBBER TnE IND sTRY (Racial Policies
of American Industry Rep. No. 6, 1969); Kovarsky, Apprentice Training Programs and
Racial Discrimination, 50 IowA L. REv. 755 (1965).
117. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y.
1970), modified, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971), supplemented, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1280 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
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nomically and professionally motivated to take on added responsibility,
and thus may be equally susceptible to the pressures to make "polit-
ical" awards.
Fifth, the submission and collective bargaining agreements may
limit the arbitrator's authority. Disputes are frequently presented to
arbitrators without a submission so that the collective bargaining agree-
ment is the sole limitation. But limited ,by the agreement or the sub-
mission or both, arbitrators making civil rights decisions may be unable
to render justice, and unable to take into account social and economic
considerations that make arbitration attractive in other areas. In some
jurisdictions, public agencies, such as state fair employment commis-
sions, can adjudicate such disputes after decisions by arbitrators. But
there is little likelihood that grievants will seek aid elsewhere after
arbitration even where they are not subject to the election doctrine.11 8
Since the Steelworkers trilogy, some employers have sought by con-
tract or stipulation to limit the authority of the arbitrator. If contracts
exclude the arbitration of civil rights cases, arbitrators presumably
would refuse to hear the disputes or face reversal by court order. But
only where contracts clearly limit authority will courts void awards.
To completely eliminate by contract the hearing of all civil rights cases,
employers would have to specifically exclude -the types of cases they
wish to keep from arbitration. But since the grievant may find an
adequate-but more expensive-remedy elsewhere, contracts gener-
ally do not exclude civil rights controversies from arbitration.
Finally, the size of the company or union, or the number of disputes
brought to arbitration, are believed to slant the arbitrator's opinion.' 19
The large firm and -union are more likely to arbitrate grievances than
the small firm and union. A particular industry or firm might con-
sistently arbitrate more disputes than other industries or firms. For
example, jurisdictional disputes are more common in the construction
trades than in manufacturing, and unions have resorted to arbitration
118. Often the agreement is so vague that the arbitrator's personal sense of justice
will tip the decision, buttressed by the published awards of others, absolving him from
complete responsibility. See Tobias, In Defense of Creeping Legalism in Arbitration,
13 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 596, 597-98 (1960). For a view that the use of precedent
in arbitration is undesirable, see Doyle, Precedent Values of Labor Arbitration A wards,
42 PERSONNEL J. 66 (1963).
119. See generally Harris, The Influence of Institutional Factors on Arbitration
Awards, 20 LAB. L.L 716, 719 (1969).
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to settle them.120  Since sections 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D) of the Taft-
Hartley Act encourage unions to settle jurisdictional rivalries if
enployers agree, arbitrators will find the construction industry a pro-
fitable hunting ground.'
Our research revealed that the investigation of arbitrators before
appointment is common.122  An overwhelming majority of the re-
spondents in each category indicated that investigation was conducted
"very often." As might be anticipated, there was greater uncertainty
of the practices of "other employers and unions," but more than fifty
percent of the respondents in each category felt certain that others
investigate artitrators at least to some extent. Experienced and in-
experienced arbitrators are aware that they are frequently investi-
gated.' 2 1 While knowledge of investigation before selection does not
120. See Cole, Jurisdictional Issues and the Promise of Mergers, 9 INi. & LAD. REL.
REV. 391 (1956); Dunlap, Jurisdictional Disputes, N.Y.U. 2D ANN. CoNF. ON LAB. 477,
496 (1949).
121. See Herzog v. Parsons, 181 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810
(1950); Local 595, Bridge Workers Union, 112 N.L.R.B. 812 (1955); Los Angeles
Bldg. Trades Council, 88 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1950).
122. TABLE IX
INVESTIGATION OF ARBITRATORS BEFORE SELECTION
Investigation of Frequency of Investigation of
Arbitrators by Arbitrators by Other Employers
Respondents and Unions*
Respondents Yes No If Yes, How Often Yes No If Yes, How Often
Unions 82 7 Very Often 59 76 1 Very Often 38
Sometimes 20 Sometimes 19
Don't Know 2 Don't Know 20
Employers 195 0 Very Often 180 75 115 Very Often 49
Sometimes 8 Sometimes 49
Don't Know 0 Don't Know 23
Lawyers 315 51 Very Often 272
Sometimes 47
Don't Know 4
* Lawyers were not asked whether other lawyers investigate arbitrators because the na-
ture of their work calls for investigation.
123. See P. PRAsow & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CON-
FLICT RiESOLUTION IN LABOR RELATIONS 14-15 (1970); Friedin, The Status and Expend-
ability of the Labor Arbitrator, in THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ABrIRATION 55 (Na-
tional Academy of Arbitrators, Proceedings of the 10th Annual Meeting, 1957); Mac-
Donald, The Selection and Tenure of Arbitrators in Labor Disputes, N.Y.U. IST ANN.
CoNF. ON LAB. 145, 178-79 (1948); Raffaele, supra note 86, at 234; Segal, Arbitra-
tion: A Union Viewpoint, in THE ARBITRATORS AND THE PARTIES 56 (National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators, Proceedings of the I lth Annual Meeting, 1958); Strauss, supra note
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establish influence upon opinion, some effect is inevitable. Whether
the effect is widespread, as I believe, or limited, cannot be positively
established, but there has to be some influence.
Respondents were also asked to indicate the methods they rely on
to investigate arbitrators. 2 4 Four means of investigating arbitrators-
examining published awards, contacting other employers or unions,
employing special investigators, and examining lists prepared by asso-
ciations or unions-were listed in the questionnaire. It was antici-
pated that the published awards of arbitrators would be investigated
and acquaintances contacted ,to evaluate arbitrators. In fact, a recur-
ring criticism from respondents was the unavailability of more pub-
lished awards to examine so that investigations could be more
thorough. Specialized firms to investigate arbitrators are used fre-
quently by employers, adding to arbitration costs. Union leaders, on
the other hand, seldom hire special investigators. Evidently, there are
a large number of lists prepared by employers and unions pertaining
to the strengths, weaknesses, and social attitudes of arbitrators. Has
a widespread system of blacklisting developed in civil rights disputes?
That so few -arbitrators handle -the bulk of disputes points in 'this direc-
tion.
89, at 205-06; Tobias, supra note 118, at 597; Whiting, Arbitrators and the Remedy
Power, in LA3OR ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 73 (National Academy of Arbi-
trators, Proceedings of the 16th Annual Meeting, 1963).
124. TABLE X
METHODS USED TO INVESTIGATE ARBITRATORS
I Contact with Other Firms,
Published Awards* Unions, or Lawyers
Respondents Very Don't Very Don't
Often Sometimes Never Know IOften Sometimes Never Know
Lawyers 153 176 12 34 157 197 6 19
Employers 159 35 1 0 45 141 6 4
Unions 42 31 3 12 28 51 1 9
Hire Specialized Association or Union
Firms to Investigate List of Arbitrators
Very Don't Don't
Often Sometimes Never Know Yes Never Know
Lawyers 55 61 196 67 186 112 75
Employers 52 44 91 9 111 17 66
Unions 1 4 33 51 42 21 26
* American Arbitrators Association, Commerce Clearing House, and Labor Arbitration
Reports.
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Respondents were asked whether undertaking an investigation de-
pended on whether the arbitrator is well-known or unknown. 25 As
anticipated, unknown arbitrators undergo extensive investigation.
Surprisingly, well-known arbitrators, while less often investigated than
unknown arbitrators, also face considerable investigation. Well-
known arbitrators were more frequently investigated in the "some-
times" category than unknown arbitrators; this may indicate a desire
to ferret out the attitude of an arbitrator with respect to a particular
subject. And one area where well-known arbitrators will be investi-
gated is civil rights.
The investigation of the views of well-known arbitrators also dis-
proves the claim that unions and employers are interested only in com-
petency and not social philosophy. This conclusion is based on the
assumption that well-known arbitrators have established their compe-
tency. Adding the "very often" and "sometimes" categories for both
well-known and unknown arbitrators, there is little difference in the
frequency of investigation. In fact, the investigation by management






It should be noted that only a few of the respondents claimed that
arbitrators are never investigated.
Since most arbitrators are carefully investigated in civil rights dis-
putes, it might be anticipated that they are selected for their social
views, with ability a desirable but not paramount quality. Respon-
125. TABLE XI
FREQUENCY OF INVESTIGATION OF WELL-KNOWN
AND UNKNOWN ARBITRATORS
Well-Known Unknown or Inexperienced
Arbitrators Arbitrators
Respondents Very Don't Very Don't
Often Sometimes Never Know Often Sometimes Never Know
Lawyers 116 199 24 39 281 62 4 29
Employers 142 48 4 1 124 39 17 6
Unions 27 40 9 13 58 19 2 9
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dents were asked whether arbitrators espousing "liberal"'120 social
views are bypassed.12 7  The results show that lawyers and employers
frequently bypass liberal arbitrators if the "very often" and "some-
times" categories are totaled. While few union respondents turn down
liberal arbitrators, it seems reasonable to assume that the frequency
rate increases in disputes involving minorities.
Only twenty-three lawyers (6.1% ) claimed that arbitrators are never
turned down because of their social outlook. Lawyers do attempt to
select the remedy, jurisdiction, and even the judge most likely to favor
their clients. There is no reason to suppose that this perceived advan-
tage is not sought in the selection of arbitrators. In fact, to do other-
wise may be interpreted as legal incompetence by peers. That so
many of the lawyer-respondents complained of the limited number of
published awards may indicate that there is considerable interest in
the social views of arbitrators.
Unions were asked if arbitrators with "conservative social views" are
turned down.128  The responses were split-exactly one-half indicated
126. One responding lawyer who represents employers objected to the language "lib-
eral" and "conservative" in the questionnaire, feeling that management is not conserva-
tive or interested in fighting unions and that unions in civil rights cases are less pro-
gressive than employers. While there may be some merit to this position, the terms
"liberal" and "conservative" were used as a description of the arbitrator and not of em-
ployers or unions. Naturally, if "conservative" arbitrators are selected it does reflect
the bias of the selector. Furthermore, people supporting civil rights are usually labeled
"liberal" rather than "conservative," although there are exceptions. See generally
Peterson, Consequences of the Arbitration Award for the Unions, 21 LAn. L.J. 613,
615-17 (1970).
127. TABLE XII
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH LIBERAL
ARBITRATORS ARE BYPASSED*
Respondents Very Often Sometimes Never Don't Know
Lawyers 129 128 23 96
Employers 33 89 35 29
Unions 1 13 29 45
Total 163 230 87 170
* It is conceded that the meaning of "liberal" is not precise.
128. TABLE XIII
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH CONSERVATIVE
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that they do bypass conservative arbitrators. If the question were pin-
pointed to the question of black promotion, it is possible that more
union respondents would favor conservative arbitrators.
To gain full perspective on the tendency of the parties to bypass
arbitrators with liberal social views, respondents were asked to char-
acterize this tendency in both unions and employers. 129 There was
substantial support from all three categories of respondents that em-
ployers are more likely than unions to turn down the liberal arbitrator.
To determine whether the reaction of employers and unions to liberal
arbitrators was related to the subject matter of the dispute we asked
the respondents whether arbitrators are "less likely to be bypassed
and/or investigated when the subject matter is of a technical na-
ture."1 ' The responses demonstrate that every category of respon-
dent finds that the social outlook of arbitrators is less important in
technical disputes. These data substantiate the hypothesis that the
social views of arbitrators will be more carefully scrutinized in non-
technical disputes, such as civil rights grievances.
Information was sought from the respondents as to whether the pro-
129. TABLE XIV
WHO IS MORE LIKELY TO BYPASS LIBERAL ARBITRATORS
Choices
Respondents Employers Unions Neither Don't Know
Lawyers 303 4 8 64
Employers 138 3 6 40
Unions 80 1 5 4
Total 521 8 19 108
130. TABLE XV
LIKELIHOOD THAT LIBERAL ARBITRATORS WILL
BE BYPASSED IN TECHNICAL DISPUTES
Choices
Respondents Yes No Don't Know
Lawyers 157 114 108
Employers 74 70 36
Unions 36 31 22
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cess of selection influenced the decisions of arbitrators.131  There are
four possibilities: (1) arbitrators cannot be influenced; (2) arbitrators
are unaware that they accommodate their clientele; (3) industrial
peace requires accommodation and arbitrators are simply doing their
jobs; or (4) arbitrators knowingly compromise in order to succeed.
Respondents were asked whether it is more likely that well-known or
inexperienced arbitrators will make compromise awards to assure their
selection in the future. Although many respondents indicated that
they did not know-an understandable response since the answer re-
quires an interpretation of another man's motive-many felt that both
well-known and unknown or inexperienced arbitrators are likely to
compromise. Although all groups indicated that well-known arbitra-
tors are less likely than unknown or inexperienced 'arbitrators to com-
promise, a surprising 37.1% of all respondents believed that even well-
known arbitrators are susceptible. 13
It is useful at this point to consider explanations advanced to ex-
plain compromise that have been developed by sociologists and psy-
chologists who study human behavior.133 Even though specific studies
of arbitration have not been published, sociological and psychological
131. TABLE XVI
COMPROMISE DECISIONS BY ARBITRATORS
Unknown or Inexperienced
Well-Known Arbitrators Arbitrators
Respondents Yes No Don't Know Yes No Don't Know
Lawyers 151 140 87 194 45 140
Employers 55 115 22 79 29 85
Unions 38 39 11 45 20 24
Total 244 294 120 318 94 249
132. It is appropriate to compare the role of the arbitrator with that of the federal
judge, particularly since the civil rights grievant may now have an easier time bringing
his complaint under Title VII. While federal judges also bring to their decision-mak-
ing task their particular backgrounds and philosophies, and while their selection itself
reflects their politics to a large extent, they are less likely to "accommodate" union
leaders and management because of stare decisis and because of the economic indepen-
dence of the federal judiciary. Arbitrators, on the other hand, are subject to great pres-
sure to compromise so that they will be selected again; they do not enjoy life tenure,
and the money and prestige they earn depend on the willingness of the parties to select
them on a case-by-case basis.
133. See generally A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (2d ed. 1970); D.
McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVnqG SOCIaTY (1961); F. HERZBERG, WoRKc AND TnE NATURE
Or MAN 71 (1966).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/8
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data pertaining to motivation are relevant in trying to understand the
factors which influence decision-making by arbitrators. Arbitrators,
like others, seek material success and try to avoid failure and psycho-
logical discomfiture when possible.' 34  To avoid stress when faced
with new situations which may carry the possibility of criticism, incon-
sistency with previous beliefs, or other pressures, the arbitrator may
attempt to reduce these pressures by reinforcing his beliefs or ration-
alizing them. Behavior patterns of arbitrators are likely to be consis-
tent due to similarity of training, background, and economic expecta-
tion. Unless an arbitrator radically alters his thinking on a particular
subject, his behavior can be predicted.135 Predictability, whether from
economic aspiration, social background, or psychological behavior, is
important to society, for it avoids the confusion and misunderstanding
that follow irrational or unexpected behavior. For this reason, for ex-
ample, precedent in the law is valued highly.
Arbitrators function in this psychological milieu and there is no rea-
son to believe that they are a unique group in this regard or that psy-
chological or economic success follow by "calling the shots" as they
see them."" Arbitrators solving employer-union disputes learn rapid-
ly, through both trial and error and observation, that one-sided opin-
ions are quickly labeled as biased, and are not tolerated by the parties. 137
And arbitrators can correctly anticipate unfavorable and costly re-
action to civil rights and other decisions considered injurious either
to plant efficiency or to union power.38  Moreover, the arbitrator is
much more vulnerable than a federal judge because he is appointed
by people who expect a favorable decision. 39 The pressures on arbi-
trators to conform to expectations are thus unquestionably greater than
on state or federal judges.' 40  Clearly, arbitrators will frequently dis-
134. See Festinger, An Introduction to the Theory of Dissonance, in CURRENT PER-
SPECTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 347 (2d ed. E. Hollander & R. Hunt 1967); cf. I.
ATKINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO MOTIVATION 221-67 (1964).
135. See Zajonc, The Concepts of Balance, Congruity, and Dissonance, 24 PUB.
OPINION Q. 280, 296 (1960).
136. See V. VROOM, WORK AND MOTIVATION 8-19 (1964).
137. See E. HILGARD & G. BOWER, THEORIES OF LEARNING 1-22, 457-90 (1966).
138. See 13. BASS & J. VAUGHN, TRAINING IN INDUSTRY: THE MANAGEMENT OF
LEARNING 32-41 (1966); J. DEESE & S. HULSE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING 170-
207 (3d ed. 1967). See generally W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATION THEORY: A BEHAvIORAL
ANALYSIS FOR MANAGEMENT (1967).
139. See note 132 supra.
140. See J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 136-71 (1958).
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please employers and unions-any decision will displease someone to
some extent-but because of their desire to succeed economically,
and the many forces that push their thinking to the center, uncompro-
mising positions are rare.
The respondents indicated" that arbitrators do make "political"
decisions to assure future appointment. There is another possibility
not considered by the respondents: an inherent or developed tendency
in arbitrators to satisfy disputants. In fact, all decision-makers tend
to repeat solutions that have met the test of acceptability.'42 However,
the tendency of decision-makers to seek acceptability is enforced by
the manner in which arbitrators are appointed. Knowing that future
appointments hinge upon satisfying employers and unions, arbitrators
are interested not in public acceptability but in industrial acceptability.
The tendency of arbitrators to favor industrial needs over civil rights
advancement is largely the result of personal motivations and pres-
sures. Arbitrators see themselves as offering an important service,
namely keeping the industrial peace. The importance with which
arbitration as an occupation is perceived results in increased pressure
to conform. 143  This helps to explain the respondents' belief that both
well-known and unknown or inexperienced arbitrators feel the effect
of employer and union investigation and selection.144
Neophytes interested in becoming arbitrators are limited by the sys-
tem. The arbitrator in a civil rights dispute is theoretically obligated
to the grievant, employer, union, and public, but the grievant and pub-
141. See note 131 supra.
142. See Rapoport, Prospects for Experimental Games, 12 J. CONFLICT RES. 461
(1968). The author shows that prison inmates repeat the same solution in game after
game.
143. See D. CTaZTrWIGHT & A. ZANDER, GROUP DYNAMICS 139-50 (3d ed. 1968).
144. TABLE XVII
EFFECT OF INVESTIGATION ON ARBITRATORS' DECISIONS
Respondents Yes No Don't Know
Lawyers 140 72 167
Employers 66 38 86
Unions 37 20 31
Total 243 130 284
While a full-blown discussion of the value of modern psychology in understanding
the decision-making process in arbitration is beyond the scope of this Article, it should
be noted that the studies cited in notes 133-43 supra and 145-50 infra are of particular
importance and interest in illustrating the forces that create an "informal" system of
stare decisis that is largely unrecognized by attorneys.
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lic take a back seat because of the system.145 Arbitrators able to exer-
cise considerable choice may ignore evidence that leads to a solution
unacceptable to employers and unions."' While he approaches a dis-
pute with more detachment than the employer, union, or grievant, the
arbitrator's preconceptions and need to please could prohibit the con-
sideration of evidence that would lead to a disturbing decision.
Experienced arbitrators should be more aware and sensitive to the
whims of contestants than the inexperienced. Sensitivity bred by past
experience prevents or retards change in spite of shifts occurring in
other arenas resolving similar conflicts. In fact, the experienced arbi-
trator avoids discomfiture by ignoring information---Lwhy look for
trouble when there is a palatable solution?147 Arbitrators attach dif-
ferent weight to the same evidence-opinions vary as to what is pri-
mary, peripheral, or inconsequential evidence.148  Experienced con-
testants are aware that arbitrators weigh evidence differently, and
selection in part reflects the evidence that is likely to be produced.
An arbitrator who attaches little weight to indirect proof will be
avoided if that is the only kind of evidence that can be produced.
Civil rights cases are frequently decided in favor of plaintiffs who are
able to produce only indirect evidence of discrimination. There are
"conventional" arbitrators who ignore or are unaware of the latest evi-
dentiary developments. That following precedent is not required and
awards are not subject to appellate review permits arbitrators to ignore
legal change. Our study shows that employers are more likely than
unions to bypass liberal arbitrators, in part because liberal arbitrators
are more likely to accept sociological and indirect evidence 49 than
conservative arbitrators; to permit this is to chill social change. 1 0
145. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see Hinton, Environmental Frustration
and Creative Problem Solving, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 211, 216 (1968); E. Lowell, The
Effect of Conflict on Motivation, at 16-21 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Dep't of Social
Relations, Harvard University, 1952).
146. See Mills & Jellison, Avoidance of Discrepant Information Prior to Commit-
ment, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 59 (1968). This study pertains to the responses
of people reading advertisements. It can be reasoned that the arbitrator by training
and desire can limit preconceptions, but this position appears naive.
147. See Strub, Experience and Prior Probability in a Complex Decision Task, 53
J. APPLIED PSYCH. 112 (1969).
148. See Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH.
258 (1946).
149. See note 127 supra.
150. See Wishner, Reanalysis of "Impressions of Personality", 67 PSYCH. Rnv. 96
(1960).
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The respondents were asked to indicate what signs of compromise
they had observed in awards. They were given three prepared
choices--ncreased use of precedent, condescending and apologetic
wording, and "compromise" awards for grievants"1 -and also had the
opportunity to indicate other signs.",' The three prepared choices
151. TABLE XVIii
EVIDENCE OF COMPROMISE
(from choices on questionnaire)
Award Grievant
Increased Use Condescending and Only Part of
Respondents of Precedent Apologetic Wording What He Seeks
Lawyers 84 61 70
Employers 47 25 21





Response Lawyers Employers Unions
1. Arbitrator twists, assumes, or ignores evidence
or precedent
2. Arbitrator rewrites or misinterprets collective
bargaining agreement, or hears case withoutjurisdiction
3. Arbitrator states that award will not be used
as precedent, or limits scope of decision
4. Arbitrator urges parties to settle disputes,
bases award on the settlement, and refuses to
make an award
5. Arbitrator states circumstances under which
the award would have been different
6. When several cases are heard, each side wins
and loses some of the disputes
7. Arbitrator finds merit in both positions
8. Arbitrator reinstates employee after discharge
but "adjusts" discipline-e.g., by not award-
ing back pay
9. When case involves several issues, each side
wins and loses some of them
10. While finding merit in the grievance, arbitra-
tor requires only future compliance with his
decision
11. Arbitrator allows trial period in lieu of demo-
tion
12. Arbitrator is determined to follow law or
precedent
13. Arbitrator advises contestants to negotiate
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were based on an examination of published awards. First, since the
expressed use of precedent by arbitrators is unusual, reliance thereon
might indicate an unwillingness to make an unpopular award, thereby
shifting responsibility to other authorities.153 Secondly, some arbitra-
tors are by nature apologetic and courtly, so that language of this type
does not necessarily suggest compromise. Yet, overconcern for the
losing contestant, exhibited by apology, indicates some predisposition
toward compromise. 54 Finally, while splitting an award may be just,
it may also indicate compromise. For example, arbitrators frequently
decide in favor of civil rights grievants without awarding back pay,
or merely require a trial promotion.15 Typical reasons for these
14. Arbitrator compromises differences between
employer and employee 14 2 0
15. Arbitrator conducts hearing improperly 3 2 0
16. Arbitrator's award is too long and detailed 0 0 2
153. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 1157 (1969); Hall China Co.,
51 Lab. Arb. 1259 (1969); Allegheny Airlines, 48 Lab. Arb. 734 (1967); United Air-
lines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 727 (1967); Hotel Empl. Ass'n, 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966);
American Sugar Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 396 (1966); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 45 Lab. Arb.
621 (1965); DeMello's Office Furniture Co., 65-2 CCH LAB. BAi. AwaDs 5642
(1965); Mead Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 224 (1963).
154. The following are examples of apology in civil rights disputes. In American
Mach. & Foundry Co., 66-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARns 3110 (1965), the arbitrator up-
held the grievant's discharge from employment, but said, "The Union made a valiant
effort in grievant's defense .... In the absence of any plausible excuse, the penalty
must . . . stand, with clearly expressed regret on the part of all concerned." In Lock-
heed-Georgia Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 769, 772 (1970), the arbitrator held for the employer,
but said, "I hope that [complainant] will understand and accept the fact that the griev-
ance procedure and the arbitration hearing ... have given him the opportunity to have
his complaint fairly and sympathetically weighed .... an opportunity which was until
recently not available and is still not available in many parts of the world." For other
examples, see Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 101 (1969); Hercules Box Co., 52
Lab. Arb. 79 (1968); Oldberg Mfg. Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 509 (1968); McCall Corp., 49
Lab. Arb. 183 (1967); American Airlines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 705, 708 (1967); McCall
Corp., 67-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 4751 (1967); Minute Maid Co., 63-2 CCH LAB.
ARB. AwARDs 4893 (1963); James R. Kearney Corp., 62-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWABDS
5033 (1962).
155. I-T-E Imperial Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. 1284 (1970); Gross Distr., Inc., 55 Lab.
Arb. 756 (1970); Frito-Lay, Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 1142 (1970); Avco Corp., 54 Lab. Arb.
165 (1970); American Enka Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 562 (1969); Allegheny Airlines, 48
Lab. Arb. 734 (1967); W.M. Chace Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 231 (1966); International Paper
Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 896 (1966); Paterson Parchment Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 260 (1966);
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. 238 (1966); Lockheed-Georgia Co., 66-3 CCH
LAB. ARB. Awmws 1 6686 (1966); Braniff Airways, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 769 (1965);
Dewey-Portland Cement Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 165 (1964); Rockwell-Standard Corp., 42
Lab. Arb. 638 (1964).
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awards are that the employer acted in "good faith" or that the
employer viewpoint was "reasonable." The responses indicate that all
three groups had witnessed evidence of compromise most frequently
in the use of precedent by arbitrators-45.2% of the respondents
selected this choice.
Respondents were asked to indicate the five most common reasons
for not using particular arbitrators."' The respondents established
that the background, philosophy, and past performance of arbitrators
are of much greater concern to the participants than competency.
This conclusion is further supported by responses to the question of
how frequently arbitrators are rejected because of the disagreement
156. TABLE XX
COMMON REASONS FOR NOT SELECTING
PARTICULAR ARBITRATORS
(reasons provided by respondents) *
Frequency
Response Lawyers Employers Unions
1. Bias or past experience favoring employers 54 3 20
2. Bias or past experience favoring unions 74 88 1
3. Excessive charges 6 3 0
4. Improper conduct at hearing 8 23 1
5. Arbitrator too busy or delays making awards 11 1 2
6. Past association with employer, union, or pro-
union government agency 14 5 2
7. Analysis of past awards 63 41 37
S. Personal experiences with arbitrator 14 3 4
9. Lack of legal background 3 3 1
10. Arbitrator unwilling to discharge 7 3 0
11. Lack of technical knowledge or experience in
a particular industry 5 2 4
12. Adverse comments of others 2 2 0
13. Personality 0 0 1
14. Nationality or religion 0 0 1
15. Tendency to compromise 5 2 2
16. Arbitrator either unknown or inexperienced 0 0 2
17. Liberal views of arbitrator 19 1 0
18. Incompetency 6 0 0
19. Arbitrator exceeds his authority 14 1 0
20. Arbitrator overly concerned with legal proce-
dure, technicality, or theory 13 3 1
21. Legal background 2 0 2
• Admittedly, there is some overlap among the responses. Where the exact meaning
of a response was unclear, it was not grouped with others. Many respondents did
not answer this question.
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of the selectors with the arbitrator's previous awards. 15 7 A vast major-
ity of all groups of respondents indicated that arbitrators are either
frequently or occasionally turned down because their awards are dis-
agreed with.
III. CONCLUSION
Few of the respondents favored a significant change in the current
system of arbitration, which permits unfettered control by employers
and unions. While there are some contractual provisions which limit
the selection of arbitrators, on the whole contestants have considerable
freedom. In fact, many of the suggestions made by the respondents-
for example, publishing more awards, reducing delays, and increasing
the supply of experienced arbitrators-serve the purpose of allowing
the contestants an even wider range of selection.
Even though most of the respondents did not express an opinion
or only favored limited change, many of them felt that arbitrators
make "political" decisions, and that this is desirable because it reflects
that the decision-makers are responsible to those who hire them. This
control over selection appears to be exceptionally damaging to civil
rights grievants. At a time when the cost of arbitration is rising while
the number of civil rights disputes submitted to arbitration is increas-
ing, the advocacy of continued employer-union control is suspicious
since public agencies are well-equipped to protect these grievants.
Those few respondents who did recommend some change in the
arbitration system supported the following innovations:
1. The collective bargaining agreement should designate arbitra-
tors, allowing the signatories to select one from this list as dis-
putes arise. Note that the employer and union initially de-
cide who is acceptable and then limit their choice to those
named.
157. TABLE XXI
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH ARBITRATORS ARE TURNED DOWN
BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENTS WITH PREVIOUS AWARDS
Frequency
Respondents Very Often
& Sometimes Never Don't Know
Lawyers 360 1 18
Employers 117 23 38
Unions 74 1 4
Total 551 25 60
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2. Some public agency or tribunal, either state or federal, should
appoint the arbitrator. Some lawyers felt that a federal judge
should name the arbitrator. Presumably, the arbitrator's de-
cisions would then be supported by the judge unless legally
erroneous. It is presumed that the respondents did not wish
that appointments be restricted to lawyers.
3. Either a separate arbitration court should be created, or arbi-
tration duties should be delegated to the NLRB, which could
create a separate division of arbitration.
4. The American Arbitration Association or Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service should either appoint the arbitrator
or submit a list of names from which the employer and union
must make a selection.
Ideologically, the arbitrator should be free to make any decision he
considers just so long as it is authorized by the collective bargaining
agreement. His responsibility in a civil rights dispute is not only to
the employer and union but to the grievant and to society, which has
forbidden discrimination. Given this responsibility, decisions cannot
be tolerated when the needs of the grievant have to be compromised
in order to satisfy employers and unions whose priorities differ from
those declared by society.
Labor arbitration is a necessity in our society; its importance cannot
be denied. There is nothing to indicate that arbitration will assume
less importance in the future; in fact, in the civil rights arena there
are indicators that arbitration will play a more important role. Yet,
neither Congress nor the courts seem to acknowledge that. the condi-
tions favoring the promotion of arbitration at the time of Lincoln Mills
and the Steelworkers trilogy have changed.
Some federal agency should be charged with the selection, training,
and appointment of arbitrators. Due to the myriad of important prob-
lems submitted to arbitration, a persuasive argument can be made for
the creation of an arbitration board. In this way, fees and craftsman-
ship can be standardized, with employers and unions assuming the cost
of maintaining the system. The arbitration board would be respon-
sible for selecting arbitrators who are competent, objective, and famil-
iar with the peculiarities of the industry and dispute in question. Many
employers, unions, and arbitrators would not welcome this change, out
of self-interest. But the public policy of fair employment calls for an
end to a private industrial spoils system.
[Vol. 1974:59
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Because courts do not review awards and employers and unions
select the arbitrator, the needs of the grievant can be ignored with im-
punity. While the grievant could get a court to overturn an award
if he can establish bad faith on the part of the selectors' 58 and arbitra-
tor, this rarely occurs because the manner in which arbitrators are
selected eliminates the need for bad faith. Also, there is considerable
difference between bad faith and bad judgment on the part of the arbi-
trator. While it is less difficult to establish bad judgment, seldom can
it be established that the arbitrator acted in bad faith. 159
Since the NLRB has taken the position that it will not hear unfair
labor practice charges that are arbitrable, a system of compulsory arbi-
tration is developing in which the grievant has little choice. The
employer and union, given the NLRB approach, are also required to
arbitrate, but they can select the arbitrator, which provides them with
considerable flexibility. Placing selection of the arbitrator within the
authority of a federal agency or arbitration board would permit arbitra-
tors a freer hand to decide cases objectively, and would return civil
rights disputes to public accountability.
158. Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
159. See Whitmore v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 83 L.R.R.M. 2978 (E.D. Mich.
1973).
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APPENDIX
The following groups of questions were sent to unions, employers, and
lawyers. Their answers supplied the information reflected in the Tables.
I. Unions






2. If not personally involved, do you know the specific factors con-




3. Have you ever served as a union representative during a hearing
held before an arbitrator?
Yes
-No
If yes, how often?
Very often
Sometimes





What accounts for employers or unions being more careful (if
either side is) in the selection of arbitrators?








6. Do you think that arbitrators are carefully investigated by other
[Vol. 1974:59
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unions prior to selection?
-Yes
-Ngo




7. How often are the published awards (Commerce Clearing House,
American Arbitration Association, Bureau of National Affairs)





8. Do employers carefully investigate arbitrators before selection?
-_Yes
..__-.No
9. How often are other union officials or attorneys contacted to





10. How often are private firms specializing in the investigation of





11. Do you know of any employers, associations, or unions that have
prepared lists of arbitrators showing tendencies to make certain
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13. How often are unknown or inexperienced arbitrators carefully in-





14. How often are arbitrators bypassed by unions because of their










.. J on't know






16. Are arbitrators with liberal social views less likely to be bypassed
and/or investigated by unions when the subject matter of the




17. How often are arbitrators bypassed because union representatives





18. Is it likely that well-known arbitrators will try to appease both the
employer and union by making a compromise-type award? (A
compromise-type award is defined as one which gives something
[Vol. 1974:59
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19. Is it likely that unknown or inexperienced arbitrators will make a




20. Is it likely that arbitrators, knowing that they will be investigated





21. If the current method of selecting ad hoc arbitrators affects their
decisions, it will show up in
_ ncreased use of precedent to support the award
-_Condescending and apologetic wording to placate the loser
Awarding the grievant only part of what he seeks
22. List other indications of a compromise-type award.
23. In your opinion, what are the most common reasons for unions
not selecting a particular arbitrator?
24. What defects, if any, have you noticed in the current manner in
which employers and unions select arbitrators?












If not personally involved, do you know what factors are con-
sidered important by the officials of your firm who select arbi-
trators?
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Yes
--- No
2. Have you represented your firm before an arbitrator?
-Yes
-No
If yes, how often?
Very often
-Sometimes





What accounts for the employer or union being more careful (if
either side is) in the selection of arbitrators?




If yes, how often?
Very often
Sometimes








6. How often does your firm review the published awards of arbi-
trators (Commerce Clearing House, Bureau of National Affairs,





7. How often are other firms or disinterested attorneys contacted
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Never
Don't know
8. How often are private firms which specialize in the investigation of





9. Do employers or unions prepare lists of arbitrators showing





10. How often are unknown or inexperienced arbitrators carefully in-





11. How often are well-known arbitrators carefully investigated by





12. How often does your firm bypass arbitrators because of their












14. Are arbitrators with liberal social views bypassed because offi-
cials in or representing your firm disagree with past decisions?
-Yes
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-No
Don't know
15. Are arbitrators with liberal social views less likely to be bypassed
and/or investigated by your firm when the subject matter of the




16. Is it likely that well-known arbitrators will try to appease both the
employer and union by rendering a compromise-type award? (A




17. Is it likely that unknown or inexperienced arbitrators will render a




18. Is it likely that arbitrators, knowing that they will be investigated
before selection by employers or unions, will take this into ac-
count when making awards?
-Yes
Don't know
19. If the current methods of selecting ad hoc arbitrators affect their
decisions, it will show up in
._ ncreased use of precedent to support the award
-_Condescending and apologetic wording to placate the loser
... Awarding the grievant only part of what he seeks
20. List other ways in which arbitrators show a tendency to make
compromise-type decisions.
21. In your opinion, what are the most common reasons for employers
refusing to accept a particular arbitrator?
22. What defects, if any, have you observed in the current manner in
which employers and unions select arbitrators?
23. Would you recommend other means of selecting ad hoc arbitrators?
-Yes
---- No
If yes, be specific.
[Vol. 1974:59
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III. Lawyers








If not, how much exposure do you get to this kind of practice?
-Considerable
._._ _ ittle
3. When representing a client, how often have you assisted in the





4. If not involved, do you know what specific factors your clients
consider important when selecting an arbitrator?
-____Yes
--- No




If yes, how often?
-_Very often
____Sometimes





What accounts for the employer or union being more careful (if
either side is) in the selection?
7. Do you think that arbitrators are carefully investigated before be-
ing approved by your clients?
-Yes
- No
If yes, how often?
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8. How often are the published awards (Commerce Clearing House,
American Arbitration Association, Bureau of National Affairs) of





9. How often are other employers, union officials, or attorneys con-





10. How often are private firms that specialize in the investigation of





11. Do you know of any employer associations or unions that have
prepared lists of arbitrators, showing tendencies to make certain
















14. How often are arbitrators bypassed because of their published or
[Vol. 1974:59
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16. Are arbitrators with liberal social views less likely to be by-
passed and/or investigated when the subject matter of the griev-




17. How often are arbitrators bypassed because employers or unions





18. Is it likely that well-known arbitrators will make a compromise-
type award to assure future selection? (A compromise-type award




19. Is it likely that unknown or inexperienced arbitrators will make a




20. Is it likely that arbitrators, knowing that they will be investigated




21. If the selection process affects arbitrators' decisions, it will show
up in
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Increased use of precedent to support the award
Condescending and apologetic wording to placate the loser
_. Awarding the grievant only part of what he seeks
22. List other means used by arbitrators who make a compromise-
type award.
23. In your opinion what are the five most common reasons for not
using a particular arbitrator?
24. What defects, if any, have you noticed in the current manner in
which arbitrators are selected?
25. Would you recommend other means of selecting ad hoc arbitra-
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